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∎ In the last two decades, international delegitimization of Israel has 
become a new mode of operation for those denying Israel’s right to exist. 
It encompasses a wide range of civil-society and grassroots organizations. 
∎ The campaign attempts to imitate the logic of the struggle against the 
South African apartheid regime – hence to undermine Israel’s inter-
national legitimacy in a manner that would lead to its isolation and even-
tually cause it to collapse. 
∎ In its current phase, the campaign functions as a long-term effort to grad-
ually change the discourse and mindset of Israel’s critics in the West. Its 
main goal is to mainstream delegitimization – hence to reposition anti-
Zionism from the radical margins into the mainstream of Western liberal-
progressive circles, with specific emphasis on critics of Israel’s policies. 
∎ A key strategy to mainstream delegitimization is to blur the differences 
between criticism of Israeli policy and challenges to Israel’s basic legiti-
macy. This includes efforts to turn items of the delegitimization agenda 
into an integral part of the political debate about Israel. 
∎ As a result, many critics of Israel’s policies end up supporting efforts that 
are led by the delegitimization campaign. The discussion in the West on 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is gradually developing into a dichotomous 
encounter between supporting Israel and its policies unquestioningly or 
supporting anti-Zionism. 
∎ The international delegitimization campaign negates two core principles 
of European foreign policy. First, it stands in direct contradiction to 
Europe’s core commitment to Israel’s right to exist. Second, it promotes 
rejectionism in Palestinian society as an alternative paradigm to the long-
standing European approach of negotiated solution with Israel. 
∎ The key to confronting delegitimization while providing latitude for criti-
cism is the application of constructive differentiation between criticism 
of Israel and delegitimization. Critics of Israel should apply responsibility 
in discourse and action by addressing both their associative context and 
organizational affiliations with these campaigns of criticism. European 
civil-society and political actors should differentiate between different 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Unpacking the Global Campaign to 
Delegitimize Israel 
Drawing the Line between Criticism of 
Israel and Denying Its Legitimacy 
Delegitimization of the counterpart’s right to self-
determination has been the common feature of 
the century-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this 
respect, the breakthrough in mutual recognition 
achieved between the parties during the 1990s could 
be seen as an exception to the norm, rather than a 
sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, in the last two decades following 
the collapse of the Oslo process and the outbreak of 
the Second Intifada, international delegitimization 
of Israel has become a new mode of operation for 
those denying Israel’s right to exist. It takes the form 
of a global civil society-led campaign to precipitate 
the collapse of Israel’s political model by branding 
Israel as a “pariah state.” In this context, the cam-
paign strives to imitate the main logic of the struggle 
against the South African apartheid regime. It aims 
to undermine Israel’s international legitimacy in a 
manner that would eventually lead to its isolation 
and damage its resilience. A key method used to 
achieve this goal is to demonize Israel by associating 
it with some of the most notorious human-rights 
violators of the 20th century, and above all with the 
apartheid regime itself. 
This new trend adds an important international 
dimension to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is 
turning Europe and Germany into active fora. It pre-
sents an aspect of the conflict that takes place not in 
Israel or the occupied territories, but in the heart of 
Europe and the West. Within the German political 
context, the topic of delegitimization is most appar-
ent in the debate over the Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions (BDS) movement. Inspired by the BDS cam-
paign against the apartheid regime, the call for the 
economic, political, and cultural boycott of Israel (2005) 
has since been adopted by dozens of international 
organizations around the globe. The movement and 
its radical goals have influenced the intellectual 
debate across Europe, not only in regards to Israel and 
anti-Zionism, but also broader matters, such as the 
definition of anti-Semitism and the right to free speech. 
Nevertheless, while some see the BDS movement as 
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being synonymous with delegitimization, it is only 
one component in a much broader campaign, one 
type of effort in a series of strategies aimed mainly 
at undermining Israel’s legitimacy. 
During the last year, much of the discussion in 
Europe on the delegitimization of Israel has been 
dominated by the debate over the relationship be-
tween delegitimization and anti-Semitism. The ques-
tion of whether denying a people’s right to self-deter-
mination should count as a form of discrimination 
against them is a worthy topic for discussion. Never-
theless, it often serves as a diversion from discussing 
what counts as delegitimization in the first place, 
and where the line distinguishing delegitimization 
of Israel from criticism of its policy should be drawn. 
A key strategy of the delegitimization campaign 
during the last decade has been the attempt to blur 
the differences between delegitimization of Israel and 
criticism of its policies. Delegitimization of Israel is 
often understood as an open and direct challenge to 
Israel’s right to exist. The delegitimization campaign 
is mostly known for its crude public expressions (e.g., 
anti-Zionist demonstrations). Nevertheless, a closer 
examination exposes a different dimension of the cam-
paign – as a gradual “slow-variable” process. In this 
regard, I refer to a long-term effort to gradually change 
the discourse and mindset of critics of Israel’s policies 
through the continuous application of subtle and 
sometimes implicit means. During the last decade, 
the campaign has attempted to mainstream delegiti-
mization, that is, to turn items of the delegitimization 
agenda into an integral part of the mainstream politi-
cal debate about Israel’s policies. Paradoxically, the 
strategy of blurring the differences between delegiti-
mization and criticism is also shared by actors within 
the Israeli right. These actors try to discredit criticism 
of the Israeli government’s policies in the occupied 
territories by branding it as “anti-Zionist” (and often-
times “anti-Semitic”). 
One of the delegitimization campaign’s main 
achievements is the ability to brand itself as the main 
venue for pro-Palestinian activity. Movements such as 
the BDS campaign and the Apartheid Week Initiative 
create a direct linkage between being pro-Palestinian 
and opposing Israel’s basic political model. This, in 
turn, contributes to a greater dichotomy and polariza-
tion of political opinions regarding the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict. Influenced by both the delegitimization 
campaign and the counter campaign, the discussion 
on this conflict in the West is gradually developing 
into an all-or-nothing encounter between two rigid 
narratives: supporting Israel and its policies unques-
tioningly or supporting anti-Zionism. As a result, 
many critics of Israeli policies who do not oppose 
Israel’s right to exist end up supporting efforts that 
are led by the delegitimization campaign. 
The declining image of Israel within progressive-
liberal circles can hardly be attributed solely to the 
delegitimization campaign’s influence. It is also the 
result of Israeli government policies during the last 
decade – with emphasis on the expansion of settle-
ments and plans to annex parts of the West Bank – 
which indicate the government’s own retreat from 
the two-state-solution framework. Nevertheless, it 
is also unlikely that the delegitimization effort will 
simply cease to exist if Israel changes these policies. 
As emphasized by its leadership and agenda, the cam-
paign is not setting out to undermine Israel’s occupa-
tion policy, but rather the core legitimacy of Israel’s 
political model. Moreover, the campaign has a con-
tributing influence on the further decline of the two-
state solution in the eyes of the Palestinian public at 
a time when this framework is facing considerable 
challenges on both sides of the aisle. 
In order to confront the campaign’s attempts to 
enter the European mainstream, I propose a practical 
framework of constructive differentiation that aims 
to curtail delegitimization while preserving the value 
and integrity of criticism. This framework is designed 
to tackle these exact strategies of blurring and the 
dilemmas they present to European policy planners at 
both the governmental and non-governmental levels. 
First, on the policy level, instead of treating all actors 
involved in delegitimization as one monolithic group, 
I propose making a distinction between different levels 
of involvement and contribution to delegitimization 
activity and offer a set of guidelines to engage with 
each type of actor. European political and civil society 
actors engaged with implicit supporters of delegitimi-
zation could play a proactive role in encouraging 
their counterparts to differentiate between criticism 
and delegitimization in their activities and discourse. 
Second, I recommend that critics of Israeli policy (who 
do not consider themselves anti-Zionists) apply a policy 
of responsibility in discourse and action. I emphasize 
the importance of considering the organizational af-
filiations and associative meaning of the campaigns 
they support, as well as the common “gray areas” be-
tween criticism of policy and delegitimization. In this 
context, the proposed framework perceives the debate 
stage rather than the courthouse as the main arena 
for an effective effort to confront delegitimization. 
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Delegitimization is an extreme form of negative cat-
egorization. It is the normative claim that an actor 
or a type of behavior should be excluded from the in-
group on the basis of its immorality. 
The exceptional meaning of acts of 
delegitimization is the direct 
attribution from one’s behavior onto 
one’s basic moral quality. 
Different from other means of normative condem-
nation, the exceptional meaning of acts of delegitimi-
zation is the direct attribution from one’s behavior 
onto one’s basic moral quality.1 Hence, the severity 
of the act of delegitimization, even when directed 
toward a specific type of behavior, blurs the distinc-
tion between the vice and the basic character of its 
perpetrator. The process of outcasting serves not only 
to define who should be considered legitimate from 
the in-group perspective, but also to outline the 
moral boundaries of a specific community, and what 
lays beyond it.2 
More than simply a moral indicator, delegitimiza-
tion efforts serve as an instrument in the process of 
political interaction. Delegitimization serves as a key 
function of political discourse, as a method to indi-
cate moral differences and set boundaries through 
common speech acts such as blaming, accusing, 
 
1 Paul Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice 
(London, 2004), and Neta Oren and Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Det-
rimental Dynamics of Delegitimization in Intractable Con-
flicts: The Israel-Palestinian Case,” International Journal of Inter-
cultural Relations 31, no. 1 (January 2007): 111–26. 
2 Oren and Bar-Tal, “The Detrimental Dynamics of Delegiti-
mization in Intractable Conflicts” (see note 1). 
marginalizing,3 and in radical cases, demonizing.4 
Whether in the fight against slavery, honor killings, 
or racial segregation, the moral delegitimization of 
practices and their facilitators had been used as a 
strategy to precipitate social change.5 On the other 
hand, delegitimization of the enemy serves as a com-
mon strategy in inter-communal conflicts, with an 
emphasis on protracted conflicts. Delegitimization 
labels are often used by political actors to convince 
the in-group of the existence of a moral zero-sum 
game vis-à-vis the adversary and refute the possibility 
of a compromise.6 As part of the moral exclusion 
process, the act of delegitimization contains an in-
herent attack on attempts of “communicative co-
operation”7 with the delegitimized party. Therefore, 
acts of delegitimization are considered among “the 
major detrimental forces to peaceful resolution” in 
intractable conflicts.8 Among the escalatory functions 
it fulfills in such conflicts, delegitimization provides a 
justification for the continuation of hostilities, as well 
as for the use of violence against the counterpart. In 
addition, it serves as one of the main tools of in-group 
mobilization. 
In international relations, the concept of “external 
legitimacy” is often used in relation to the recogni-
tion given by the international community to sover-
 
3 Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse (see note 1). 
4 Rusi Jaspal, “Delegitimizing Jews and Israel in Iran’s 
International Holocaust Cartoon Contest,” Journal of Modern 
Jewish Studies 13, no. 2 (July 2014): 167–89. 
5 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revo-
lutions Happen (New York, NY, 2011). 
6 Oren and Bar-Tal, “The Detrimental Dynamics of Delegiti-
mization in Intractable Conflicts” (see note 1). 
7 Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse (see note 1). 
8 Oren and Bar-Tal, “The Detrimental Dynamics of Delegiti-
mization in Intractable Conflicts” (see note 1). 
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eign nations. Nevertheless, a nation’s inclusion with-
in the international community appears less often in 
relation to the procedural threshold conditions and 
more often in relation to the nation’s adherence to 
basic international norms. The act of international de-
legitimization often involves assigning distinct labels 
for nations that show contempt for such norms.9 The 
labels of “pariah state,” “rogue state,” or “backlash 
state” have been used by international actors as moral 
categorizations aimed to justify the exclusion and 
isolation of certain nations from the international 
community. In some cases, they are used to justify 
an international action against such nations, either 
in the form of a military action or economic sanc-
tions.10 In the context of the Middle East, the term 
“backlash states” had been used by US officials to 
describe and justify punitive steps against Iran, Libya 
under Muammar Gaddafi, and the Ba’athist regime 
in Iraq (among other nations in other regions) on 
the basis that they posed a threat to regional security 
(through their efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction or their support of terrorism), as well as 
on the basis of their human rights violations against 
their own citizens.11 Different from matters of inter-
state legitimacy or global standing, calls to treat a 
nation as a “pariah state” often originate from the 
sub-national level, for example from lobby groups 
and civil society. The campaign against the apartheid 
regime in South Africa stands as a prominent exam-
ple of the ability of a civil society-led coalition to con-
tribute toward the international isolation of a state 
in a manner that precipitated its regime’s demise. 
 
9 Thomas Henriksen, “The Rise and Decline of Rogue 
States,” Journal of International Affairs 52, no. 2 (2001):  
349–73. 
10 These terms are used in two interconnected contexts: 
They are mainly associated with nations that pose a security 
threat to regional or global peace (e.g., in the case of North 
Korea). Second, they are used in the process of moral con-
demnation of the regime’s gross violation of human rights 
(e.g., the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia). See Martin Beck and 
Johannes Gerschewski, “On the Fringes of the International 
Community: The Making and Survival of ‘Rogue States,’” 
Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace 27, no. 2 (2009): 84–90. 
11 Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign 
Affairs 72, no. 2 (1994), https://fam.ag/2z5Yx6E (accessed 
21 April 2020). 
 The international delegitimization of Israel campaign – a new paradigm of resistance to Zionism 
 SWP Berlin 
 Unpacking the Global Campaign to Delegitimize Israel 
 June 2020 
 9 
The international delegitimization of 
Israel campaign – a new paradigm 
of resistance to Zionism 
Inspired by the anti-apartheid struggle, the delegiti-
mization campaign of Israel does not intend to chal-
lenge the morality of a specific national policy or a 
form of state behavior. Instead, it aims to undermine 
the moral foundations of the nation itself, by delegiti-
mizing the political model upon which it exists. 
In the last two decades, the international attempts 
to undermine the legitimacy of Israel have become 
a driving force behind a broad civil society campaign 
encompassing a wide range of civil society organiza-
tions, grassroots groups, as well as local and inter-
national initiatives. This diverse group of actors shares 
an overarching goal – to delegitimize the political 
model of the state of Israel by tarnishing its basic 
image as well as by promoting policy steps to support 
its demise. This movement has no headquarters – 
no central governing body regulating or allocating its 
efforts. Instead, it operates as a sort of distributed 
network – that is, a loosely connected network of 
international actors, each working separately within 
their own local context, but mutually led by a joint 
effort to promote a specific political agenda through 
different means. This combined effort turns delegiti-
mization into a new strategy of active opposition to 
the existence of the state Israel. 
Despite the diversity of actors involved in the cam-
paign and their decentralized mode of operations, the 
campaign nevertheless functions as a coordained, net-
work-based global effort. Its tactics and agendas are 
often coordinated through a number of organizational 
hubs, its member organizations share strategies, 
use similar discourse,12 exchange knowledge through 
joint forums, and coordinate joint transnational 
actions during times of crisis (see the section “The de-
legitimization campaign – main catalysts and organi-
zational logic”). 
In its current form, the 
delegitimization campaign presents a 
new paradigm for the long-standing 
fight against Zionism. 
In its current form, the delegitimization campaign 
presents a new paradigm for the long-standing fight 
against Zionism, which resonates in the campaign’s 
agency and strategy. First, previous efforts to fight 
Zionism in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict were 
mostly led by nations and proto-states. However, this 
campaign is mostly based on a wide array of civil 
society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
This feature increases the effectiveness of the move-
ment in reaching a broad audience in the West. The 
movement enjoys the relative public popularity of 
civil society organizations and grassroots activity. It 
also enables the movement to detach itself from con-
troversial and unpopular representatives of anti-Zion-
ism, such as radical regimes. Second, while previous 
anti-Zionist efforts focused considerably on military 
action as the main method to precipitate the collapse 
of Zionism, this campaign is largely defined by the 
adaptation of the strategy of non-violent resistance. 
 
12 For example, terms and concepts such as “ethnic cleans-
ing,” “apartheid,” “colonialization,” “pink-washing,” and 
“green-washing.” Perceived martyrs such as Muhammad 
Al-Durrah and the American activist Rachel Corrie achieve 
a status of icons, which is replicated by different nodes in 
different global locations. 
The Delegitimization 
Campaign against Israel: 
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Third, the delegitimization campaign reveals a close 
alliance between Middle Eastern and Western actors. 
The movement often functions through interfaces 
between global political actors (e.g., radical left-wing 
activists in Europe) and regional actors (e.g., Hamas 
affiliates in Europe). It serves as a meeting place for 
regional anti-Zionists and opposers of Zionism, which 
often share very little in common other than their 
animosity toward Israel.13 
Anti-Zionism in historical perspective: 
From state-based logic of destruction to 
a civil society-based logic of implosion 
The political-diplomatic struggle against Israel’s right 
to exist is a long-standing effort that can be dated 
back to the first days of Israel’s existence. However, 
in the first two decades following the establishment 
of Israel (1948), it can be seen as a secondary strategy 
in the overall attempt to undermine the new state’s 
resilience. The main approach, which was mostly 
led by the Nasser regime in Egypt and by the Ba’ath 
regimes in Syria and Iraq, to bring about the demise 
of the Jewish state focused on physical destruction by 
military and economic means,14 rather than on inter-
national or public advocacy.15 
The gradual shift from a direct destructive approach 
to an international challenge of its legitimacy is partly 
an outcome of the 1967 Six-Day War. First, the war 
signified a change in the Soviets’ tone toward Israel 
and an enhancement of Soviet-led political efforts to 
delegitimize Zionism. This effort culminated in the 
Soviet-led General Assembly Resolution 3379 (1976, 
revoked in 1991), which claimed Zionism to be “a 
form of racism and racial discrimination.” Second, 
the war signified the decline of the destruction para-
digm, that is, the belief that the elimination of Israel 
 
13 A vivid example for such a meeting place is the series of 
“Cairo Conferences” since 2002, which have been attended 
by a wide spectrum of anti-Zionist activists, ranging from 
the radical European Left to members of Middle East–based 
Islamists. See elaboration about this forum in the chapter 
“The Delegitimization Campaign against Israel” (p. 9). 
14 See, for example, the Arab Boycott, the 1966 Arab 
League decision to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River. 
15 The Reut Institute, Building a Political Firewall Against 
Israel’s Delegitimization – Conceptual Framework (Tel Aviv, March 
2010), 31–38, http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/ 
20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf (accessed 2 December 
2019). 
could be achieved by military means alone. Moreover, 
the war precipitated a change in the political mindset 
of the Arab political elites toward the concept of terri-
torial compromise with Israel. In the following years, 
with the signing of peace treaties between Israel, 
Egypt (1979), and Jordan (1994), the Arab taboo of 
recognizing Israel as a sovereign state was essentially 
broken.16 In parallel, the 1967 war initiated the shift 
of the Palestinian struggle from the Arab nations to 
the Palestinian national movement.17 The emergence 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a 
central actor also redefined the international com-
munity as a key target audience. Lacking the military 
capacity to engage in a direct confrontation with 
Israel, the logic of the PLO in its early phases18 was to 
combine guerrilla warfare with an attempt to mobi-
lize international support for the Palestinian cause.19 
Beyond raising international awareness about the 
Palestinian plight, the movement was active in creat-
ing a web of political and military ties with radical 
left-wing organizations in Europe under the banner 
of solidarity between revolutionary movements. This 
marks an historical entry point for the anti-Zionist 
 
16 Sabri Jiryis, “The Arab World at the Crossroads: An 
Analysis of the Arab Opposition to the Sadat Initiative,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 2 (1978): 26–61, https:// 
bit.ly/3cduOYd (accessed 23 December 2019). 
17 The symbolic moment marking this shift was the Arab 
League’s Rabat Summit (1974), which declared the PLO to be 
the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” 
18 PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s acknowledgment (1988) 
of UN Resolution 242 as the basis for the resolution of the 
Israeli-Arab conflict is considered a historical turning point 
in the Palestinian national movement’s approach to Israel’s 
basic right to exist. See United Nations, “Yasser Arafat Gen-
eral Assembly Speech (Part 1),” UN Radio Classics, https://www. 
unmultimedia.org/classics/asset/C792/C792a/ (accessed 21 
April 2020). The signing of the first and second Oslo Accords 
(1993, 1995) is considered a ratification of the movement’s 
commitment to the two-state solution framework. See Avi 
Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Process,” in Louise 
Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford, 2016), 
241–61. 
19 One main example is the Stages Program accepted by 
the Palestinian National Council in 1974, which supported 
the use of diplomatic means (alongside armed struggle) to 
negotiate the “liberation” of parts of the nation as a gradual 
basis to achieve the final objective of the “liberation of 
all Palestinian territory.” See Permanent Observer Mission 
of Palestine to the United Nations, “10 Point Program of 
the PLO (1974),” https://bit.ly/2xx3rch (accessed 23 December 
2019). 
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agenda into the European radical left’s debate, 
although in this phase its acceptance was mostly 
limited to the extreme left. Despite growing criticism 
about Israeli occupation and a change in the basic 
perception of Israel as the conflict’s “underdog,” clear 
notions of anti-Zionism failed to gain much traction 
among the mainstream European left. Even during 
focal events such as the Sabra and Shatila Massacre 
(1982) and the outbreak of the First Intifada (1987), 
the protest against Israel was mostly limited to its 
policies. Challenges to Israel’s basic legitimacy among 
the mainstream were relatively rare.20 
The Second Intifada as the defining con-
text of the new delegitimization campaign 
The collapse of peace talks at the Camp David Sum-
mit (2000) – and even more so the outbreak of the 
Second Intifada a few months later – provided the 
political and practical context for an international 
delegitimization campaign against Israel. 
For Palestinian protagonists of the campaign, 
turning to international delegitimization of Israel 
mainly emanates from the failure of both the nego-
tiations and armed struggle strategies in the first 
decade of the millennium. First, the collapse of the 
peace process strengthened the voices opposing 
the Oslo Process-based two-state solution within the 
leadership of the Palestinian national movement 
as well as among intellectuals and the diaspora.21 
Second, the wide-scale military confrontation of the 
Second Intifada represented a nadir in Palestinian 
elites’ belief in the feasibility of reaching an agreed 
solution with Israel. Third, the destructive impact 
of the Second Intifada on the Palestinian society and 
political milieu and its failure to achieve concert 
political results demonstrated the limits of the armed 
struggle approach. The rising popularity of the non-
violent international delegitimization method could 
therefore be seen as an outcome of adaptive learn-
ing – it is perceived mainly among key members of 
Palestinian civil society and the youth as a viable re-
placement to the two previous paradigms of national 
 
20 Based on a series interviews conducted by the author 
in London and Israel in February–September 2010 and 
January–April 2019. 
21 Khalil Shikaki, “Do Palestinians Still Support the Two-
State Solution? Why Israeli Settlements Are the Greatest 
Obstacle to Peace,” Foreign Affairs, 2018, https://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-09-12/do-palestinians-
still-support-two-state-solution (accessed 2 December 2019). 
action, which failed to yield results. The non-violent 
struggle method already existed in the Palestinian 
narrative as a core strategy during the First Intifada 
(1987–1993). However, in the post–Second Intifada 
context, it not only serves as a method to advocate the 
Palestinian right to self-determination, it is also often 
directed at challenging the Jewish people’s right to self-
determination. In such a climate, the struggle against 
the policy of occupation and the opposition to the 
legitimacy of this policy’s creator – Israel – tend to 
converge in Palestinian narratives and social beliefs.22 
The Second Intifada also served as a basis for co-
operation between Palestinian challengers of Israeli 
legitimacy and political allies in the West. The inter-
national audience became a key part of the Palestin-
ian tactic of struggle during the Second Intifada. The 
asymmetric nature of warfare, which was mostly con-
ducted within Palestinian urban centers, the high fric-
tion levels between the Israeli military and the Pales-
tinian population, and the high toll in Palestinian 
civilian casualties provided the context for the mobili-
zation of international outrage against Israel. It often 
led to portraying Israel in the international media as 
a country involved in war crimes.23 As such, it pro-
vided fertile ground to turn the outrage over Israel’s 
actions into a challenge of its international legitimacy. 
The Durban Conference and the “apart-
heid strategy”: Precipitating Israel’s col-
lapse through global isolation 
Convened during the early phase of the Second Inti-
fada (2001) in Durban, South Africa, the World Con-
ference against Racism (WCAR, also known as Durban 
I) provided both the conceptual and practical basis 
for the emergence of a civil society-led campaign of 
delegitimization. It served as the ideal site to turn 
the success story of the global civil society campaign 
against the apartheid regime in South Africa into a 
source of inspiration for a civil society battle against 
Zionism. The Durban Conference constitutes a key 
event in providing the ethos and political context, 
and of no less importance, in shaping the strategies 
 
22 Based on a series of interviews conducted by the author 
in London and Israel in February–September 2010 and 
January–April 2019. On the convergence of anti-occupation 
and delegitimization discourses, see section “Discursive 
choices of articulation” (p. 30). 
23 “UN to Send Mission to Jenin,” The Telegraph, 20 April 
2002, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1391591/UN-to-send-
mission-to-Jenin.html (accessed 21 April 2020). 
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and interfaces that have led this movement ever 
since. 
The conference was convened under the auspices 
of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for 
Human Rights with the aim of combating racism and 
racial discrimination in accordance with UN General 
Assembly Resolution 52/111. The conference’s main 
forum was attended by governmental delegates. How-
ever, the major arena in relation to delegitimization 
was the NGO forum, combining around 3,000 inter-
national NGOs, which was held in parallel to the 
main conference at a nearby venue. On the inter-state 
level, attempts by Israel’s enemies to use the inter-
national platform to reintroduce the reference to 
Zionism as a form of racism were eventually blocked 
by Western nations and the High Commissioner her-
self.24 Nevertheless, the NGO forum turned into what 
American political columnist Charles Krauthammer 
described as an exhibition of hate aimed “to brand 
one country as uniquely transcendently evil.”25 
The final NGO forum declaration denounced Israel’s 
“brand of racism and apartheid and other crimes 
against humanity and […] ethnic cleansing.” Israel 
was also accused of “genocide,” and the establishment 
of Israel was defined as a “hate crime” in itself.26 
The Durban conference was the place 
where the strategy of implosion – the 
perception that the international 
isolation of Israel would eventually 
lead to its collapse – was first set. 
On the practical level, the Durban Conference has 
served as the basis for the consolidation of the main 
strategies used by the delegitimization campaign 
to brand Israel as a pariah state until this day (often 
dubbed “the apartheid strategy”27). This was the place 
 
24 As referred by Marry Robinson: “[T]he specific debate 
that Zionism is racism has been used […] to challenge 
the very existence of the State of Israel itself.” See Harris 
Schoenberg, “Demonization in Durban: The World Confer-
ence Against Racism,” The American Jewish Year Book 102 
(2002): 85–111 (87), http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/ 
NGOS/WCAR/SCHOENBG.PDF (accessed 23 December 2019). 
25 Harris Schoenberg, “Demonization in Durban” 
(see note 24), 95. 
26 Ibid., 102–103. 
27 Honest Reporting, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) – An 
Introduction (January 2012), https://honestreporting.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/BDS-an-Introduction.pdf (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
where the overarching strategy of implosion, that is, 
the perception that the isolation of Israel on the inter-
national level – politically, economically, and cul-
turally – would eventually lead to its collapse, was 
first set.28 It was also the site where this strategy was 
broken down to a practical set of methods that were 
later implemented into policy campaigns. Two strat-
egies discussed in Durban later became main pillars 
of the movement’s activity and still serve as its modus 
operandi. The NGO forum in Durban is considered to 
be the conceptual birthplace of the BDS movement.29 
Second, the concept of using universal jurisdiction to 
persecute Israeli nationals and officials in international 
tribunals was raised in the NGO forum’s “action pro-
gram.” The participants’ focus on these two specific 
strategies, which are synonymous with the fight 
against South Africa’s apartheid regime, was designed 
to demonstrate the argued resemblance between this 
regime and Israel, and to “crown” Israel the new apart-
heid state. The forum was also one of the sites in 
which the discourse and vocabulary of the new cam-
paign was created. Terms such as “ethnic cleansing, 
“genocide,” and narratives affiliating Zionism with 
the apartheid regime might have appeared before. 
However, the Durban forum was a main catalyst in 
turning them into a common script to be used by 
different nodes of the delegitimization campaign in 
various contexts. 
Lastly, the Durban forum illustrated the emerging 
alliance between region-based anti-Zionists and op-
posers of Zionism from the international radical left. 
The forum was initiated through a joint effort of 
 
28 It was defined in the discussions as an effort toward 
the “launch of an international anti-Israeli-apartheid move-
ment” that would implement “a policy of complete and total 
isolation of Israel […] the full cessation of all links.” See Harris 
Schoenberg, “Demonization in Durban” (see note 24), 102–03. 
29 On the importance that the BDS movement allocates to 
the WCAR as a conceptual basis, see Palestinian Civil Society, 
“United against Apartheid, Colonialism and Occupation – 
Dignity and Justice for the Palestinian People,” Palestinian 
Civil Society’s Strategic Position Paper for the Durban Review 
Conference, Geneva 20–24 April 2009, https://bds move-
ment.net/files/English-BNC_Position_Paper-Durban_Review. 
pdf (accessed 23 December 2019). 
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Palestinian and Arab NGOs30 alongside neo-Marxist 
and radical left-wing organizations.31 
The delegitimization campaign – 
main catalysts and organizational logic 
On the international level, the delegitimization cam-
paign originated with – and is perpetuated by – five 
core groups. As a network-based campaign, it is hard 
to identify a clear hierarchy or division of labor be-
tween these core groups. Previous work presumed the 
dominance of Western members of the campaign in 
guiding and influencing Palestinian members. Never-
theless, as the evolution of the BDS movement as well 
as the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” initiative of 201032 
show, Palestinian protagonists often take a leading 
role in shaping the campaign’s activities and standing 
issues. 
Actors affiliated with the radical left in Europe and North 
America – These actors serve as the main hub of con-
textualized delegitimization, with special emphasis 
on the anti-colonialism movement and neo-Marxists. 
In the last decades, Israel has been perceived within 
these circles as one of the main, of not leading em-
bodiment of “colonialism.” In the United Kingdom, 
for example, far-left organizations such as the Stop 
the War Coalition and the Socialist Workers Party 
have taken a leading role in promoting the delegiti-
mization of Israel through demonstrations, confer-
ences, and activism.33 
 
30 For example, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights 
and the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human 
Rights and the Environment. 
31 Michael Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences 
(New York, NY, 2005), 177–82. 
32 The “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” (2010) – the attempt to 
launch an international flotilla to “break Israel’s siege” over 
Gaza. It developed into a violent clash in the high seas with 
the Israel navy. It stands as testimony to the delegitimization 
campaign’s ability to mobilize its different groups and hubs 
into a joint and coordinated action, mainly Hamas activities 
and affiliates, Palestinian diaspora organizations, and radical 
left-wing groups. See Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla: The 
Collapse of Israel’s Political Firewall (Tel Aviv, 2010), http://reut-
institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3900 (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
33 One of the vocal speakers for the delegitimization cam-
paign is former member of British Parliament George Gallo-
way, the founder of the far-left Respect Party (dissolved in 
Opposers of Zionism within academic and intellectual 
circles – This group represents a wide array of aca-
demic researchers, philosophers, and thinkers who 
reject Zionism as a form of political expression. 
Among this very diverse group, we can broadly dis-
tinguish between two ideological schools of thought. 
On the one hand, there are the intellectuals and 
scholars who reject Zionism as an inherently ille-
gitimate political model based on its incompatibility 
with their moral justifications of national sovereignty. 
One representative of this mindset is the philosopher 
Michael Neumann of Trent University, who referred 
to Zionism, rather than to Israel’s actions, as the main 
cause of the Israeli-Arab conflict.34 On the other hand, 
we find intellectuals and scholars such as the feminist 
philosopher Judith Butler,35 the historian Ilan Pappe, 
and the political scientist Norman Finkelstein,36 all 
of whom reject the Zionist model based mainly on 
Israel’s past and current policies toward the Palestin-
ians. A common feature in this scholarly trend is the 
tendency to connect the Zionists’ actions during the 
1948 Arab-Israeli War, which they often describe as 
“ethnic cleansing,” with Israel’s current policies of oc-
cupation in order to indicate the inherent immorality 
of the Zionist model itself.37 
Far from representing a monolithic scholarly 
movement, this group nevertheless plays two impor-
tant roles in promoting the delegitimization cam-
paign globally. First, they provide a scholarly frame-
work for the grassroots activity of the campaign’s 
 
2016). In Spain, the far-left Podemos party served as a driving 
force in promoting the municipal boycott of Israel as part 
of the BDS campaign. See Shiri Moshe, “‘Wave’ of Anti-Israel 
Municipal Resolutions Pass in Spain with Help of Far-Left Par-
ties,” the algemeiner, 24 June 2018, https://www.algemeiner. 
com/2018/06/24/wave-of-anti-israel-municipal-resolutions-
pass-in-spain-with-help-of-far-left-parties/ (accessed 24 Octo-
ber 2019). 
34 Cleland Lefevre, “Professor Neumann and Beyond – A 
View from the Left,” jewishtribalreview.org, 12 February 2004, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060903122650/http://www. 
jewishtribalreview.org/lef.htm (accessed 2 December 2019). 
35 See, for example, Judith Butler, Parting Ways – Jewishness 
and the Critique of Zionism (New York, NY, 2012). 
36 “Norman Finkelstein: Israel Is Committing a Holocaust 
in Gaza,” Today’s Zaman, 19 January 2009, https://bit.ly/ 
2Wncbdv (accessed 23 December 2019). 
37 Itamar Inbari, “måh šeyiśråʾ el biṣåʿ h be-48 hẇʾ  ṭihẇr 
ʾ etnyi” (translation: “What Israel conducted in 1948 is 
ethnic cleansing”), maʿ ariv, 9 October 2006 https://www. 
makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART1/488/649.html (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
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activists. They introduce the challenges to the basic 
legitimacy of Zionism as well as related concepts, 
such as imposing the one-state paradigm, into the 
academic discussion. Second, this group has had a 
pivotal role in lending credibility to the delegitimiza-
tion campaign among the intellectual elites in the 
West. In this context, academia serves as a major hub 
for the promotion of the delegitimization of Israel. 
The academic boycott of Israel is one of the main 
pillars of the BDS movement.38 
An influential trend in the intellectual debate over 
Israel’s legitimacy is the growing attempt by the cam-
paign’s supporters to apply segments of Intersection-
ality Theory39 to encourage a unified position against 
Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. Hence, the call 
for collaboration between different minority groups 
against dominant power structures is utilized by the 
campaign’s supporters to place Zionism as a main 
target. This utilization serves as a factor in changing 
the progressive elites’ discourse regarding Israel and 
the conflict. Its effect can be seen in the relative ease 
with which radical anti-Zionist positions are adopted40 
by academic associations and movements represent-
ing minorities.41 
Palestinian civil society organizations and the BDS move-
ment – Challenges to Israel’s political legitimacy 
became a defining feature for the current generation 
of post-Oslo Palestinian civil society leaders. It is a 
common component of the ideology presented by key 
Palestinian civil society actors active both in Israel 
and in the occupied territories. Usage of the discourse 
of delegitimization – such as the terms “apartheid” 
and “colonialization” – became part of the common 
jargon of these organizations in their daily internal 
 
38 BDS Movement, “Why Boycott Israeli Universities?” 
https://www.bdsmovement.net/academic-boycott (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
39 Reut Group, Navigating Intersectional Landscapes – Rules for 
Jewish Community Professionals, (Tel Aviv, 2019), https://www. 
reutgroup.org/Publications/Navigating-Intersectional-
Landscapes (accessed 24 October 2019). 
40 Nick deSantis, “Native American-Studies Group’s Lead-
ership Supports Israel Boycott,” in The Chronicle of Higher 
Education (2013), https://web.archive.org/web/2016030419 
2152/https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/native-american-
studies-groups-leadership-supports-israel-boycott/70673 
(accessed 3 June 2020). 
41 “Statement on Black Lives Matter Platform,” truah, 
4 August 2016, https://www.truah.org/press/statement-on-
black-lives-matter-platform/ (accessed 24 October 2019). 
communication as well as in their international 
engagement. Above all, this mindset of rejection 
has shaped Palestinian civil society’s code of conduct 
toward Israel and Israelis, as evident in the key role 
it played in the establishment and promotion of the 
BDS movement. 
The BDS movement – initiated in 2005 through 
the “Palestinian civil society call for BDS” – has 
become a trademark of Palestinian civil society, both 
as a rallying call within Palestinian society as well as 
an advocacy campaign directed at the international 
community. On the organizational level, the BDS 
movement is orchestrated by the Palestinian BDS 
National Committee (BNC), an umbrella organization 
composed of 28 leading members of Palestinian civil 
society. Among the signatories to the call, one can 
find political advocacy groups such as the “Palestin-
ian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign” along-
side general organizations representing a wide range 
of audiences and topics, such the General Union of 
Palestinian Women and the General Union of Pales-
tinian Teachers. One of the main promoters of BDS 
is the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) – a key civil 
society actor comprising 67 Palestinian NGOs.42 
Nevertheless, in this overarching atmosphere of 
delegitimization within Palestinian civil society, an 
important distinction should be made between Pales-
tinian NGOs, which are actively involved in the BDS 
campaign or in other forms of delegitimization, and 
NGOs that passively support these campaigns. The 
latter’s support of BDS should be contextualized (but 
not ignored) by the strong in-group pressures that 
exist within Palestinian civil society to support BDS 
(see discussion on implicit delegitimization in the chap-
ter “Four Shades of Criticism and Delegitimization,” 
p. 33). 
Palestinian diaspora – Key members of the Palestinian 
diaspora in the West play an important role in pro-
moting the delegitimization agenda. They mainly 
fulfill two capacities, the first of which is through the 
personal involvement of prominent members of the 
diaspora in initiating international delegitimization 
activity within the public sphere. A prominent exam-
ple is Ghada Karmi, a lecturer at the University of 
Exeter and a vocal opposer of Israel’s right to exist in 
both academic and public circles in the United King-
dom. The second capacity is through the activities of 
 
42 BDS Movement, “Palestinian BDS National Committee,” 
https://bdsmovement.net/bnc (accessed 23 December 2019). 
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prominent Palestinian diaspora-led organizations 
such as the Palestinian Return Centre (PRC) and 
Al-Awda – The Palestine Right to Return Coalition. 
Spread across Europe, these organizations keep close 
connections through joint forums and conferences. 
One example is the “Palestinians in Europe Confer-
ence,”43 which has been hosted by the PRC in differ-
ent locations across Europe since 2003, and is often 
used to plan different initiatives to delegitimize 
Israel. As a diaspora, the main policy item promoted 
by this community is the fulfillment of the right of 
return of Palestinians to Israel. Nevertheless, these 
groups’ agendas often touch upon a range of different 
topics – from the promotion of the one-state para-
digm to support for the BDS movement. Palestinian 
diaspora organizations also fulfill an important role 
as an interface between delegitimization initiators 
within the Palestinian occupied territories and poten-
tial allies in Europe and North America. For example, 
the PRC and other Hamas affiliates in Europe played 
an important role during the 2010 flotilla to Gaza 
in connecting key delegitimization organizations in 
Europe with members of Hamas’s leadership in Gaza. 
Hamas and its network of affiliates and supporters in 
Europe – In the last decade, we have seen a growing 
adoption of the logics and practices of the inter-
national delegitimization campaign by Hamas as part 
of its warfare strategy against Israel. In some cases, 
the international campaign to delegitimize Israel is 
seen as a complementary aspect to Hamas’s policy of 
violent struggle. As defined by the former chairman 
of the Hamas Political Bureau Khaled Mashal: “[W]e 
have to focus on lifting the fabricated legitimacy the 
world has provided the Zionist entity […] we are chal-
lenging Israel in the region, and the world is starting 
to be furious with it, therefore I’m saying that Israel 
has initiated the countdown leading to its end.”44 
Part of Hamas’s interest in the international cam-
paign of delegitimization is related to the movement’s 
growing effort to improve its international standing.45 
The delegitimization campaign is seen as a platform 
 
43 Palestinian Return Centre, “17th Palestinians in Europe 
Conference Kick-Started in Denmark” (London, 28 April 
2019), https://prc.org.uk/en/post/4072/17th-palestinians-in-
europe-conference-kick-started-in-denmark (accessed 24 Octo-
ber 2019). 
44 Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla (see note 32). 
45 Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007 and the pursuant 
cycles of fighting with Israel presented the movement with 
the need to gain external legitimacy. 
to enhance the movement’s own international legiti-
macy while advancing its strategic vision of under-
mining Israel’s resilience. 
In this context, the agenda promoted by the inter-
national delegitimization campaign supports several 
of Hamas’s strategic goals. On the immediate level, 
Hamas views the international pressure promoted by 
the campaign as an instrument to limit Israel’s ability 
to use its military power against the organization in 
future military clashes in Gaza. In addition, some of 
the campaign activities, such as the flotilla to Gaza, 
support Hamas’s political goal of exacting pressure 
on Israel to ease its blockade of Gaza. 
Nevertheless, on the strategic level, Hamas’s leader-
ship often refers to the long-term potential of the cam-
paign to undermine Israel’s legitimacy as a sovereign 
state.46 Accordingly, in the last decade, Hamas has 
incorporated the logic of delegitimization into the 
movement’s operational mindset. Hamas appears in 
this context as both a supporter of existing efforts as 
well as an initiator of new campaigns directed mainly 
at the international audience. 
As an initiator – Hamas took a pivotal role in or-
ganizing and coordinating the international flotilla to 
Gaza campaign through its own capacities as well as 
through affiliated organizations in Europe. 
As a supporter – Hamas was involved in the original 
call for BDS through their involvement in the BNC. In 
parallel to the organizational affiliation, leaders have 
mentioned the activities of the BDS movement as 
being an important pillar in the fight against Israel.47 
Hamas also supported the campaign’s effort to demon-
ize Israel by initiating arrest warrants against Israeli 
officials visiting Europe following “Operation Cast 
Lead” (2008–2009).48 
At the same time, the last decade has seen the 
emergence of several organizations and figures within 
the delegitimization campaign in Europe (with special 
focus on the United Kingdom) that have direct affilia-
 
46 Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla (see note 32). 
47 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Warns against ‘Normali-
zation’ amid Reports of Israel’s Upped Regional Ties,” Times 
of Israel, 7 March 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-
warns-against-normalization-amid-reports-of-israels-upped-
regional-ties/ (accessed 23 December 2019). 
48 Maya Bengal and Amit Cohen, “k̇åk hebiyʾ a ḥamʾ as 
lhozåʾ at ṣaw hamaʿ aṣår neged libniy” (translation: “This 
is how Hamas brought about the arrest warrant for Livni”), 
maʿ ariv, 20 December 2009, https://www.makorrishon.co.il/ 
nrg/online/1/ART1/980/633.html (accessed 23 December 2019). 
The Delegitimization Campaign against Israel: Actors, Logics, and Strategies 
SWP Berlin 
Unpacking the Global Campaign to Delegitimize Israel 
June 2020 
16 
tion or strong ties to Hamas.49 A central delegitimi-
zation organization that maintains strong ties with 
Hamas is the PRC – a central hub of delegitimization 
based in the United Kingdom that is active across 
Europe. In 2011 the PRC was defined by the German 
Ministry of the Interior as a cover organization for 
Hamas in Europe.50 The center maintains close ties 
to Hamas, hosts senior Hamas activists at its confer-
ences, and promotes Hamas’s agendas in Europe.51 
The last decade also has seen the enhancement of 
organizational and operational ties between suspected 
Hamas affiliates and key hubs of delegitimization in 
Europe.52 
The network-based features of the 
delegitimization campaign 
On the organizational level, members of the delegiti-
mization campaign coordinate efforts and exchange 
knowledge through a set of interfaces. 
The role of “hubs of delegitimization”53 as catalysts – 
Within the campaign, we can identify a few central 
organizations that act as hubs of sorts. These organi-
zations fulfill a role in setting the agenda and define 
standing issues for joint activity, as well as a role in 
coordinating efforts between different nodes on the 
local – and sometimes also on the transnational – 
level. One main example is the activity of the Pales-
tine Solidarity Campaign (PSC), which is a central 
network-based organization that is located in the 
United Kingdom and estimated to have more than 
 
49 The importance Hamas allocates to delegitimization 
as part of its international efforts could be seen in the case 
of Muhammad Sawalha, a senior Hamas operative based 
in London who carries diplomatic missions for Hamas in 
Europe. In the last decade, Sawalha was the driving force 
behind the establishment of a number of delegitimization 
organizations and activities, among them the organization 
of the “Gaza freedom flotilla.” See Reut Institute, The Gaza 
Flotilla (see note 32). 
50 Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 
2011 (Berlin, 2012), https://bit.ly/35sW81T (accessed 21 April 
2020). 
51 Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla (see note 32). 
52 For example, between the Palestinian Solidarity Cam-
paign, a key hub of delegitimization in the United Kingdom 
and the PRC. 
53 The Reut Institute, Building a Political Firewall against 
Israel’s Delegitimization (see note 15). The report relates to hubs 
of delegitimization as physical locations rather than organi-
zations.  
3,000 members. The PSC has been central in pro-
moting calls for boycotts and other elements of the 
delegitimization agenda in a number of arenas such 
campuses, academia, Parliament, churches, and UK 
trade unions. It has more than 40 branches across 
the United Kingdom.54 Other prominent examples of 
organizational hubs of delegitimization include the 
PRC, the BDS movement, the Friends of Al-Aqsa, and 
the Jewish Voice for Peace. The first two are also 
active in Germany.55 
Shared strategies – A unifying element of the de-
legitimization campaign is the ability to share experi-
ences and exchange practices between its members 
around the globe and through multiple organizational 
affiliations. Three main common strategies applied 
by the network as a joint method are the promotion 
of BDS, the attempt to apply universal jurisdiction 
against Israeli officials traveling abroad, and the flo-
tillas to Gaza operations (which have declined over 
the last decade). The common feature of these strat-
egies is that they are simultaneously promoted by 
different nodes of the delegitimization campaign in 
different locations around the world. 
Joint forums – The joint activities of the delegitimi-
zation campaign are supported by a number of fo-
rums, enabling inter-organizational communication, 
the exchange of knowledge, and in some cases mobili-
zation for action and the practical coordination of 
efforts. These refer to both social media forums, such 
as the “Electronic Intifada” website, that assist in 
creating an intersubjective sense of community, as 
well as physical forums in the form of periodical con-
ferences and gatherings. For example, since 2002, 
the annual conference first dubbed the “Cairo Con-
ference” (also known as “the International Campaign 
against U.S. and Zionist Occupation”), and later 
moved to Beirut, became a key meeting place of inter-
national radical-left activists (e.g., George Galloway 
and the Stop the War Coalition) and regional actors 
(including members of Hamas and Hezbollah) within 
the delegitimization campaign.56 
 
54 “PSC Branches,” Palestine Solidarity Campaign, https:// 
www.palestinecampaign.org/get-involved/branches/ (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
55 “Notes of the Knesset,” Knesset, 25 May 2016, https:// 
m.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press250516n.aspx 
(accessed 28 October 2019). 
56 Hamas affiliates in Europe used the Beirut conference 
of 2010, conducted just six months before the launch of the 
first flotilla to Gaza, to outline the flotilla action plan and 
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Shared advocacy events – One of the main advan-
tages of the delegitimization campaign is the capacity 
of key actors within it to mobilize other members 
to take joint action. This capacity has appeared to 
be especially effective during different points of esca-
lation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was a key 
force behind the anti-Israeli demonstrations that took 
place in different Western cities during large-scale 
Israeli military campaigns in Gaza in the last two 
decades, and the flotilla to Gaza operation. Another 
example is the Israel Apartheid Week, which was 
started in 2005 and offers a series of annual inter-
national events – lectures, rallies, and cultural per-
formances – that are organized simultaneously on 
university campuses and in other public locations 
across North America and Europe. Its stated purpose 
is to “raise awareness about Israel’s apartheid regime 
over the Palestinian people and build support for the 
growing […] BDS movement.”57 This event serves as a 
central outreach tool to raise support on campuses.58 
 
coordinate their efforts with European radical left-wing 
activists. See Reut Institute, The Gaza Flotilla (see note 32). 
57 Israeli Apartheid Week, “Israeli Apartheid Week” (2019), 
http://apartheidweek.org/ (accessed 24 October 2019). 
58 “Israel Apartheid Week,” Reut Group, 1 April 2006, 
https://www.reutgroup.org/Publications/Israel-Apartheid-
Week (accessed 24 October 2019). 
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The core aspect of delegitimization of Israel as a 
political agenda is the rejection of the Jewish people’s 
right to self-determination through national sover-
eignty in any part of the former area of Mandatory 
Palestine.59 
In the last two decades, there have been considera-
ble efforts to define the concept of delegitimization 
of Israel and specify its main agenda items.60 Most of 
these efforts have examined the concept of delegiti-
mization as one brand in the broader phenomenon 
of the “new anti-Semitism.” Notwithstanding their 
conceptual value, most of these efforts tend to lack 
specificity on the important issue of discussing the 
lines separating delegitimization of Israel from criti-
cism of Israeli policy.61 
 
59 See, for example, Tony Judt, “Israel: The Alternative,” 
The New York Review of Books, 23 October 2003, https://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/2003/10/23/israel-the-alternative/ 
(accessed 23 December 2019). 
60 There are two notable efforts. The first is the influential 
IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) 
“working definition of antisemitism,” published in 2016. 
See International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, “Work-
ing Definition of Antisemitism,” 26 May 2016, https://www. 
holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-anti 
semitism (accessed 23 December 2019). The second effort is 
the “3D Test of Anti-Semitism,” published in 2004 by Natan 
Sharansky. See Natan Sharansky, “3D Test of Anti-Semitism: 
Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization,” Jeru-
salem Center for Public Affairs, 21 October 2004, https://jcpa.org/ 
article/3d-test-of-anti-semitism-demonization-double-
standards-delegitimization/ (accessed 23 December 2019). 
61 An exceptional attempt to systematically deal with the 
topic can be found in Michael Herzog, The International De-
Legitimization Campaign against Israel – Analysis and Counter 
Strategy (Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2018), 
http://jppi.org.il/new/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/JPPI-De-
legitimization_eng.pdf (accessed 23 December 2019). In 
The challenge of unpacking the concept of delegiti-
mization not only relates to conceptualizing the core 
agenda of the delegitimization campaign. It also re-
quires highlighting specific “gray areas” – topics that 
often raise controversy on whether they fall within 
the category of criticism of Israel’s policy or within 
the category of delegitimization of Israel. This task 
becomes ever more important considering the delegiti-
mization campaign’s strategy of blurring the differ-
ences between criticism and delegitimization (see the 
chapter “The Strategy of Blurring the Differences 
between Delegitimization and Criticism,” p. 27). 
This chapter therefore proposes a conceptual 
framework of four core items of delegitimization and 
two selected “contested issues.” These two contested 
issues were chosen on the basis of their current policy 
relevance. This framework does not aim to delineate 
rigid fault lines, rather it aspires to encourage an in-
formed discussion on the definition of the concept 
“delegitimization of Israel.” 
Core items 
A country born in sin 
This item refers to the trend of challenging the moral 
foundations of Israel as a pretext to challenging its 
current legitimacy. This is mostly done by offering 
a certain interpretation of the historical events sur-
rounding the establishment of Israel or the Zionist 
movement in a manner that challenges its current 
 
principle, the IHRA’s “working definition” (see note 60) 
differentiates between anti-Semitism and “criticism of Israel 
similar to that leveled against any other country” but does 
not elaborate on the matter. 
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right to exist. Two main narratives are often men-
tioned by delegitimization supporters in this context. 
First, the description of Zionism and the establish-
ment of Israel as a colonial conspiracy by Western 
powers. This narrative – the sources of which could 
be found in Soviet political thought – tends to gain 
traction mostly within the anti-colonialist move-
ment.62 As put forward by the Palestinian lawyer and 
activist Hassan Jabareen: “We must state before the 
international community that the Israeli regime, 
both within and outside of the 1967 Line, is a colonial 
system that is so obviously in contravention of inter-
national law that a serious question mark hangs over 
its very legitimacy. A deficient democratic regime 
is still a legitimate regime, while a colonial regime, 
under international law, lacks legitimacy.”63 
The second narrative focuses on the claim that 
Israel executed a pre-mediated act of “ethnic cleans-
ing” or “genocide” of the Palestinian native popula-
tion during the 1948 war as a justification to argue 
its current illegitimacy. As mentioned later in this 
chapter, one of the argumentative mechanisms used 
to substantiate this claim is to portray Israel’s current 
actions as a direct continuation of its claimed “ethnic 
cleansing” policy during the 1948 war. Following this 
line of argument, one can see the existence of Israel 
as an ongoing crime/injustice. 
It is important to emphasize that this definition 
of delegitimization relates only to attempts to use a 
historical interpretation of the 1948 war in a manner 
that reflects directly on Israel’s current right to exist. 
Based on this approach, discussions about Israeli 
actions during the 1948 war or the “Nakba narrative” 
(which focuses on the suffering of Palestinian refu-
gees) are not considered in this paper as acts of de-
legitimization. 
 
62 Alex Ryvchin, “Red Terror: How the Soviet Union 
Shaped the Modern Anti-Zionist Discourse,” Australian Insti-
tute of International Affairs, 10 September 2019, http://www. 
internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/red-terror-how-
the-soviet-union-shaped-the-modern-anti-zionist-discourse/ 
(accessed 24 October 2019). 
63 “Jewish Nation State Law: Q&A with Adalah’s Hassan 
Jabareen” (Institute of Palestine Studies, 26 July 2018), 
https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/232073 (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
Demonization by association (through 
discourse and practice) 
The demonization of Israel is promoted by affiliating 
Israel and its policies with some of the worst human-
right violations of the 20th century. Creating a direct 
or associative linkage between Israel and these ille-
gitimate regimes – all of which were dismantled 
through international intervention – is designed to 
undermine Israel’s legitimacy and justify a similar 
fate for the Zionist political model. A common trend 
among the delegitimization campaign is to compare 
Israel with the Nazi regime.64 However, as examined 
in the section “The Durban Conference and the ‘apart-
heid strategy’” (p. 11), the most common method is 
to compare Israel with the South African apartheid 
regime. 
Associating Israel with a selected 
group of pariah regimes – all of which 
were dismantled through inter-
national intervention – is designed to 
undermine Israel’s legitimacy and 
justify a similar fate for Israel. 
A second instrument used to demonize Israel by 
association is “methodical typecasting,” which is the 
selective promotion of particularly harsh methods – 
previously reserved for use against the worst benighted 
regimes of the 20th century – and using them against 
Israel. The particular choice of protest methods is 
designed to present an unmistakable moral claim 
regarding the object of the protest. These methods’ 
main value is in shaping Israel’s image as a pariah 
state. Hence, by prescribing the same treatment for 
Israel as the one administered for the Nazis, the Milo-
sevic government, and the apartheid regime, the 
delegitimization campaign hopes to associate Israel 
with this notorious group of illegitimate regimes. 
Two methods stand out in this regard. 
 
64 One of the most prominent examples is international 
law scholar Richard Falk’s article in which he compared 
Israeli policies in Gaza with Nazi practices of collective 
punishment and called for the international system to stop 
Israel’s “current genocidal tendencies.” See Richard Falk, 
“Slouching toward A Palestinian Holocaust,” countercurrents, 
7 July 2007, https://www.countercurrents.org/falk070707. 
htm (accessed 23 December 2019). 
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First, the BDS movement is a key part of the at-
tempt to demonize Israel as an “apartheid”65 nation 
and challenge its basic international legitimacy.66 It 
focuses on promoting economic, academic, and cul-
tural boycotts as well as political sanctions against 
Israel. In the last decade, as part of an attempt to 
increase its public outreach, key members tried to 
downplay the movement’s anti-Zionist vision. Never-
theless, as examined at length in the section “Opera-
tional choices” (p. 28), the statements made by the 
movement’s leaders as well as their official positions 
indicate clearly their commitment to challenging 
Israel’s basic legitimacy.67 In this context, the move-
ment calls for “a boycott of Israel’s entire regime of 
oppression, including all of the Israeli companies and 
institutions that are involved in its violations of inter-
national law,” under which the movement includes 
(among other things) all of Israel’s academic and cul-
tural institutions. In addition, at least one of the three 
stated goals of the movement relates to Israel’s basic 
existence rather than to its policy – its support of 
imposing the practical implementation of the “right 
of return” of Palestinians into “their homes and prop-
erties” within pre-1948 Israel proper.68 
 
65 BDS Movement, “What is BDS?,” https://bdsmovement. 
net/what-is-bds (accessed 23 December 2019). 
66 In a statement given to the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (2009), Richard Falk defined the global BDS 
campaign as a “legitimacy war” against Israel. See Omar 
Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions: The Global Struggle 
for Palestinian Rights (Chicago, 2011). 
67 The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization of the State of 
Israel, ReViews, no. 16, 2010 (Tel Aviv: Reut Institute, 10 June 
2010), https://bit.ly/2SAdch9 (accessed 28 October 2019). 
68 BDS Movement, “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS,” 
https://bdsmovement.net/call (accessed 23 December 2019). 
The other two goals are: “Ending its occupation and coloni-
zation of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; and recog-
nizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citi-
zens of Israel to full equality.” On the radical approach to 
the right of return as a main agenda item of delegitimization 
against Israel, see also the section “A demand for an uncon-
ditional fulfillment of the ‘right of return’ of Palestinian 
refugees” (p. 20). 
The BDS movement serves as a 
branding tool for “methodical 
typecasting.” Applying an instrument 
previously reserved for the apartheid 
regime against Israel serves to 
associate the two. 
The BDS movement is often examined for the 
alleged threat it poses to Israel’s economy or political 
status. Yet, because the movement is strongly asso-
ciated publicly with the civil society-led campaign 
against the apartheid regime, its main value is as a 
branding tool. Applying an instrument previously 
reserved for the apartheid regime against Israel there-
fore serves to associate the two and challenge Israel’s 
basic legitimacy.69 
Second, the linkage between the method and the 
political agenda it hopes to promote also appears 
in the campaign’s strategic litigation efforts. The 
attempt to selectively use international jurisdiction 
and international law forums to persecute Israeli 
officials carries both a connotative and a practical 
meaning. This is a tool previously used by the inter-
national community only in cases of acute violations 
of jus cogens (such as genocide or crimes against 
humanity) – for example at the Nuremberg trials, 
and the arrest and conviction of Augusto Pinochet 
of Chile. In addition, in some cases it forms a direct 
challenge to the sovereignty of Israel’s legislative 
institutions, and therefore indirectly reflects on the 
international legitimacy of its core institutions. 
A demand for an unconditional fulfill-
ment of the “right of return” of Pales-
tinian refugees into pre-1967 Israel 
The demand for the return of Palestinian refugees, 
who fled during the 1948 war, to their homes has 
been a central political claim presented by Arab 
leaders since the establishment of Israel.70 However, 
when discussing the role of the right of return as 
a core Palestinian demand, we need to distinguish 
between two narratives. First is the position that per-
 
69 See, for example, the clear comparison in the move-
ment’s essay on “The Origins of Israel: Zionism and Settler 
Colonialism.” 
70 Some see Article 11 of UN general Assembly Resolution 
194, which resolves that “refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be per-
mitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,” as an inter-
national acknowledgment of this claim. 
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ceives the right of return as a bargaining chip71 – a 
maximum demand whose implementation is meant 
to be negotiated during the final stage of a Palestin-
ian-Israeli peace process. In this context, the traditional 
position of the international community tends to 
assert that the matter of right of return is an issue 
to be resolved in peace negotiations between the par-
ties.72 The Arab Peace Initiative (2002), which called 
for a “just and agreed upon solution” on the issue, 
demonstrates the same logic. In addition, the long-
standing approach of the international community 
toward solving the Palestinian refugee issue focuses 
mainly on the measures of economic compensation 
and refugees’ return into the future Palestinian state. 
Its basic assumption is that only a small minority of 
the refugees and their offspring would be resettled 
within the borders of pre-1967 Israel.73 
Nevertheless, the narrative promoted by the dele-
gitimization campaign presents the right of return as 
an uncompromisable right of the Palestinian people 
to be resettled in pre-1967 Israel. In this context, it is 
viewed as an inherent right that supersedes Israel’s 
right to exist as a Jewish state. It differs from the 
international community’s approach on two core 
principles. First, on the level of implementation, it 
promotes the physical return of Palestinian offspring 
to their forefathers’ prewar homes within Israel. In 
this context, prominent members of the campaign 
often refer to physical return as a tool to bring upon 
the collapse of the Jewish state. As defined by Ghada 
Karmi: “The only way to reverse (the theft of Pales-
 
71 An example of this approach can be found in top PLO 
official Salah Khalaf’s statement in 1990: “We accept that 
a total return is not possible […] We recognize that Israel 
would not want to accept large numbers of Palestinian 
returnees who would tip the demographic balance against 
the Jewish population. Nonetheless, we believe it is essential 
that Israel accept the principle of the right of return or com-
pensation with the details of such a return to be left open 
for negotiation […]. We shall for our part remain flexible 
regarding its implementation.” See Nathan Thrall, The Only 
Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Pales-
tine (New York, NY, 2017). 
72 See European External Action Service, “Middle East 
Peace Process,” 15 June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/ 
middle-east-north-africa-mena/337/middle-east-peace-
process_en (accessed 23 December 2019). 
73 See, for example, the Clinton Parameters: The Jewish 
Peace Lobby, “The Clinton Parameters,” peace lobby, 23 De-
cember 2000, https://web.archive.org/web/20150117011736/ 
http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm (accessed 
23 December 2019). 
tine) is on the basis of rights and justice; that is the 
right of return of the refugees and the dispossessed 
and the exiles back to their homeland. If that were 
to happen, we know very well that that would be the 
end of a Jewish state in our region.”74 Second, instead 
of a negotiable claim that is meant to provide lever-
age for compromise, this approach sees the right of 
return as an “irreducible minimum,”75 which cannot 
be negotiated, let alone compromised. Some repre-
sentatives of this approach claim that this right could 
not be compromised by negotiators because it consti-
tutes an “individual right,” the fulfillment of which 
depends on the individual wishes of the refugees’ 
offspring themselves. 
Moral discussions aside, it is clear that providing 
millions of Palestinians (more than 5.5 million are 
registered with UNWRA76) with an unlimited right to 
resettle in Israel carries a direct impact on the future 
existence of Israel as a Jewish state. 
Palestinian negotiators and intellectuals have 
openly acknowledged that the full implementation 
of the right of return will challenge Israel’s basic 
national identity. As emphasized by Palestinian Presi-
dent Mahmoud Abbas in an internal briefing with his 
negotiation team (2009): “As for the number of refu-
gees: it doesn’t make sense to demand that Israel take 
in five million refugees or even one million refugees 
– that would mean the end of Israel.” Nevertheless, 
in the last two decades, there has been an increase 
in support for the maximalist approach to the right 
of return within Palestinian civil society and among 
political elites. The “return of the right of return” in 
its radical form to the center of the Palestinian politi-
cal debate is one of the main examples of the radicali-
zation of opinions in Palestinian society in the post–
 
74 Richard Millet, “Ghada Karmi Calls for ‘the End of a 
Jewish State in Our Region,’” Richard Millet’s Blog, 16 January 
2011, https://richardmillett.wordpress.com/2011/01/16/ghada-
karmi-calls-for-the-end-of-a-jewish-state-in-our-region/ 
(accessed 24 October 2019). 
75 International Crisis Group, Bringing Back the Palestinian 
Refugee Question, Middle East Report, no. 156 (Brussels, 9 Octo-
ber 2014), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-
africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/bringing-back-
palestinian-refugee-question (accessed 24 October 2019). 
76 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East; see “UNRWA in Figures,” UNRWA, 
2018, https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
resources/unrwa_in_figures_2019_eng_sep_2019_final.pdf 
(accessed 24 October 2019). 
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Second Intifada era.77 It can be seen as the outcome 
of the lack of prospects for implementing the Pales-
tinian right to self-determination within an independ-
ent state. 
By presenting it as a human rights 
issue, the campaign aims to reframe 
the radical approach to the right of 
return from being a challenge to 
Israel’s existence into a valid claim 
within the mainstream discourse.  
In the international context, the radical approach 
to the right of return became a key aspect of the de-
legitimization campaign’s agenda. It appears as a 
leading action item in the attempt to use human 
rights discourse to introduce items that knowingly 
challenge Israel’s future existence into the main-
stream political discussion. In this case, the main 
challenge to Israel’s existence is not from the attack 
on its image but from the practical implications of 
the proposed policy claim. Main hubs of delegitimi-
zation, such as the BDS movement, include this 
approach to the right of return as a core political 
demand.78 Moreover, the right of return serves as the 
core platform behind the establishment of a number 
of network organizations such as the US-based 
Al-Awda – The Palestine Right to Return Coalition.79 
In addition, in the last decade the ethos of return 
was adopted as a main public cause by members of 
the “Axis of Resistance,”80 and specifically by Hamas 
(e.g., through its close relations with the PRC). Hamas’s 
focus on the topic is motivated, among other factors, 
by the realization that the topic serves as a weak 
point in relations between the Palestinian Authority 
 
77 International Crisis Group, Bringing Back the Palestinian 
Refugee Question (see note 75). 
78 BDS Movement, “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS,” 
9 July 2005, https://bdsmovement.net/call (accessed 24 Octo-
ber 2019). 
79 “About,” Al-Awda, https://al-awda.org/about/ (accessed 
24 October 2019). 
80 The term “Axis of Resistance” is mostly attributed to the 
political alliance between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. 
See International Crisis Group, Drums of War: Israel and the 
“Axis of Resistance,” Middle East Report, no. 97 (Beirut, 2 
August 2010), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-
africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/drums-war-
israel-and-axis-resistance (accessed 21 April 2020). 
(PA) and the Palestinian public and diaspora.81 Pre-
senting itself as a defender of refugees’ right to return 
therefore serves an internal interest in the power 
struggle with the PA. 
Call to enforce the replacement of 
Israel with a one-state model against 
the democratic will of its citizens 
The one-state political model has an important role 
for anti-Zionists because it presents an alternative 
theoretical model to both the Zionist project as well 
as the paradigm of the two-state solution. Its value 
for the delegitimization campaign is not so much as 
a practical program but as a political vision. 
The basic idea of the “one-state solution” is replac-
ing Israel with a bi-national state stretching from the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River in which every 
citizen enjoys equal rights. This political approach 
sees the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to 
be a model of political power-sharing between the 
residents of the former area of Mandatory Palestine 
on the basis of “one person, one vote.” This solution 
is often affiliated with a broader political ideology 
that opposes the legitimacy of states established on 
religious or ethnic principles. Therefore, it perceives 
the claim of the Jewish people’s right to self-deter-
mination through national sovereignty as improper.82 
It is important to emphasize that the examination 
of the one-state model as an aspect of delegitimiza-
tion does not relate to the validity of the political 
concept itself, but to the delegitimization campaign’s 
attempt to enforce it through international pressure 
on Israelis and Palestinians. As presented by one 
of the most prominent speakers of the one-state ap-
proach, Professor Saree Makdishi: “No privileged 
group in the history of the world has ever voluntarily 
renounced its privileges […] the Israelis will never 
relinquish their privileges until they are ‘compelled’ 
preferable [sic] by non-violent means […] to accept the 
parameters of a single democratic state.”83 This logic 
 
81 See International Crisis Group, Bringing Back the Palestin-
ian Refugee Question (see note 75). 
82 Reut Group, “Promotion of the One-state Solution” 
(Tel Aviv, 11 January 2004), http://www.reut-institute.org/en/ 
Publication.aspx?PublicationId=324 (accessed 24 October 
2019). 
83 Sam Ayache, “After Zionism, One State for Israel and 
Palestine,” dialogue-review (2012), http://www.dialogue-
review.com/en/article_33_p_17.html (accessed 28 October 
2019). 
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of coercion is often justified by the claim that the 
current political model of Israel is “illegitimate,” and 
therefore the moral imperative of replacing it super-
sedes the democratic wishes of Israel’s citizens. In this 
context, the overwhelming majority of Israelis reject 
the one-state solution. This theoretical formula does 
not even appear as a viable topic to members of the 
Jewish majority in Israel. Moreover, it receives limited 
(yet ever growing) support from the Palestinians. A 
consistent trend in public polls during the last decade 
shows that the two-state solution is still favored by 
the Palestinian public over the one-state model.84 
In the decades following the founding of Israel, the 
concept of replacing Israel with a one-state model was 
mostly presented by either radical left-wing actors 
(e.g., Matzpen85), or as a political plan to be imple-
mented following the military destruction of Israel.86 
The recent introduction of the one-state approach 
into the intellectual mainstream in the West is linked 
directly with the practical decline of the two-state 
solution in the post–Second Intifada era. On the 
normative level, it is presented by its supporters as 
a form of “just solution”87 to the conflict while pre-
senting the two-state solution as a perpetuation of 
injustice.88 On the practical level, the collapse of 
the political process, which emphasized the parties’ 
inability to fulfill the two-state solution framework, 
 
84 A poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Commu-
nication Center in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
from October 2018 indicates 37.5 percent support for the 
two-state solution as the best solution to the conflict, in 
comparison to 30.3 percent for the one-state solution. Never-
theless, support for the one-state model had increased from 
18.1 percent in February 2017, and 21.3 percent in July 
2016. See Jerusalem Media and Communication Center 
(JMCC), “Poll No. 93: Ceasefire, Confederation and Gender,” 
16 October 2018, http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps. 
aspx?id=880 (accessed 28 October 2019). 
85 Moshé Machover, “Resolution of The Israeli–Palestin-
ian conflict: A Socialist Viewpoint – Moshé Machover,” 
matzpen, 10 February 2009, https://matzpen.org/english/2009-
02-10/resolution-of-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-a-socialist-
viewpoint-moshe-machover/ (accessed 28 October 2019). 
86 For example, by the formal position of the 5th National 
Council of the PLO (1969). 
87 Virginia Tilley, The One-state Solution: A Breakthrough for 
Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock (Michigan, 2005). 
88 Cherine Hussein, The Re-Emergence of the Single-State Solu-
tion in Palestine/Israel: Countering an Illusion (New York, NY, 
2015). 
strengthened the appeal of the one-state model as a 
possible alternative.89 
The one-state approach was widely adopted and 
incorporated into the agenda of the delegitimization 
campaign as an alternative paradigm to the two-state 
solution. For example, in 2007, prominent figures 
of the delegitimization campaign – such as the co-
founder of the BDS movement, Omar Barghouti, and 
co-founder of the website Electronic Intifada, Ali 
Abunimah – joined together with international pro-
one-state scholars and organized an international 
conference in Madrid under the title “One country, 
one state” and the motto of “Enduring and just peace 
in a single state.”90 In 2012, a group of anti-Zionist 
activists and scholars, including Ghada Karmi, Diana 
Buttu, and Omar Barghouti, contributed to the pub-
lication of the collection of essays “After Zionism: 
One State for Israel and Palestine,” which aims to pro-
mote the one-state solution as a political alternative.91 
Despite its rising popularity within intellectual 
circles, the one-state solution still remains mainly a 
theoretical slogan. It has yet to lend itself as a viable 
paradigm for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict on either the regional or international level. 
Jewish organizations and American leaders often 
refer to the rising popularity of the one-state solution 
within the circles of the American progressive camp 
as the new challenge facing Israel.92 The election of 
Rashida Tlaib of the Democratic Party to the US House 
of Representatives (2019) – the first congresswoman 
to openly support the one-state solution – is per-
 
89 A poll conducted by Maryland University in 2018 
among Americans shows a tie among supporters of the two-
state and one-state solutions as the preferred solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See Sadat Chair/College of Behav-
ioral and Social Sciences Staff, “Poll: Public Support Grows 
for One-State Solution to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Mary-
land Today (University of Maryland), 13 December 2018, 
https://today.umd.edu/articles/poll-public-support-grows-one-
state-solution-israeli-palestinian-conflict-5c6cdd8a-b379-
43eb-94cb-ecbbfb666e3f (accessed 28 October 2019). 
90 “Statement: One Country, One State,” electronic intifada, 
9 July 2007, https://electronicintifada.net/content/statement-
one-country-one-state/773 (accessed 28 October 2019). 
91 Sarah Irving, “‘After Zionism’ Puts Forth Debates on 
One-state Solution,” electronic intifada, 14 August 2012, https:// 
electronicintifada.net/content/after-zionism-puts-forth-
debates-one-state-solution/11579 (accessed 28 October 2019). 
92 Amit Tibon, “One-state Solution Gains Ground in 
America – and Pro-Israel Groups Are Worried,” haaretz, 15 
December 2018, https://bit.ly/2Wnco0h (accessed 28 October 
2019). 
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ceived as an indication in this context. Nevertheless, 
despite the one-state concept being presented as an 
alternative paradigm to the two-state model, attempts 
to turn it into a political action plan among inter-
national intellectuals and practitioners alike are rela-
tively scarce. This is especially apparent when con-
sidering the attention being given to the two-state 
solution. In Israel and the West Bank, the idea of “one 
state” is still largely perceived as an imported idea 
formulated by intellectuals outside the region, rather 
than as a concrete policy option that is considered 
by local stakeholders to be feasible. On the regional 
level, the concept was mostly presented (both by the 
Israeli Zionist left and the PA)93 as a doomsday sce-
nario to increase the sense of urgency among the Israeli 
electorate to reengage with the two-state solution. 
Nevertheless, the one-state approach is a classic 
case in which Israeli government policy provides the 
basis for the promotion of a delegitimization agenda 
against Israel’s right to exist. Israel’s settlement poli-
cy, which gradually hinders the practical feasibility of 
dividing the land into two geographically consistent 
entities, and the planned annexation of parts of the 
West Bank precipitate the creation of what could be 
described as a “one-state reality” on the ground.94 
These policies are often presented by supporters of 
the delegitimization campaign as proof of the irrel-
evancy of the two-state solution paradigm.95 
Contested issues – the gray areas between 
delegitimization and criticism of Israel 
Interference in Israel’s domestic policy on 
Arab minorities’ rights 
In the last decade, the delegitimization campaign has 
been gradually adopting a new strategy to shift a 
major part of its focus to domestic issues concerning 
Israel’s treatment of its Arab minority. This trend 
 
93 Akiva Eldar, “Palestinians Threaten to Adopt One-state 
Solution,” haaretz, 26 February 2010, https://www.haaretz. 
com/1.5052297 (accessed 28 October 2019). 
94 On the one-state reality, see also: Muriel Asseburg and 
Jan Busse, The End of the Two-State Settlement? SWP Comment 
24/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 
2016), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ 
products/comments/2016C24_ass_Busse.pdf (accessed 
23 December 2019). 
95 Ayache, “After Zionism, One State for Israel and Pales-
tine” (see note 83). 
appears in the strengthening of connections between 
international delegitimization organizations and 
political actors from the Arab minority within Israel. 
Focusing on the political claims of the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel enables the delegitimization cam-
paign to promote two goals: first, to further blur the 
differences between the issue of the occupation and 
the basic questions related to the 1948 war; second, 
by internationalizing the topic, the campaign at-
tempts to challenge Israeli institutions’ legitimacy to 
fulfill state sovereignty on domestic matters. In this 
context, key members of the delegitimization cam-
paign redirected their focus to the topic of the on-
going land conflict between the Israeli authorities 
and members of the Bedouin minority in the Negev.96 
In the campaign’s rhetoric, this conflict is often pre-
sented as a continuation of the “ethnic cleansing” 
of the native Palestinian habitants in 1948.97 
There is an acute difference between 
external criticism aimed at changing 
a domestic policy and supporting an 
attempt to use the policy to challenge 
the sovereign’s right to rule. 
Criticism of a nation’s domestic policy, and espe-
cially in regards to matters of minority discrimina-
tion, is a key role of the international community, 
both on the governmental and non-governmental 
levels. Whether it is the treatment of Muslim citizens 
in China, the Hungarian treatment of Middle Eastern 
refugees, or the rise of the Alternative for Germany 
party in Germany, foreign criticism on matters that 
lie within the sovereign domain of other countries 
is an integral part of international relations. Never-
theless, there is an acute difference between external 
criticism aimed at changing a domestic policy and 
supporting an attempt to use the policy to challenge 
the sovereign’s right to rule. This is especially appar-
ent in the current case, where the challenge to Israeli 
domestic policy is conducted against the backdrop of 
an intended campaign to demonize Israel and is often 
 
96 See “Haneen Zoabi: Justice for Palestinians in Israel,” 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign, 27 January 2017, https://www. 
palestinecampaign.org/haneen-zoabi-justice-palestinians-
israel/ (accessed 23 December 2019). 
97 Nora Barrows-Friedman, “Mass Demolition as Israel 
Ethnically Cleanses Naqab Desert,” electronic intifada, 31 May 
2013, https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora-barrows-
friedman/mass-demolition-israel-ethnically-cleanses-naqab-
desert (accessed 21 April 2020). 
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promoted by anti-Zionist organizations. The main 
dilemma arises in regards to the campaigns to amend 
Israeli policy that are promoted by organizations/indi-
viduals affiliated with the delegitimization campaign. 
One example is the recent campaign against the 
“Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People” law 
(2018). The controversial law received wide criticism, 
both in Israel and on the international level, for pri-
oritizing Israel’s Jewish identity above its democratic 
nature. Nevertheless, some of the most vocal critics 
of the law were known anti-Zionists98 who used this 
legislation to question the basic legitimacy of Israel 
as a Jewish state. 
Considering the current efforts to use Israel’s 
domestic issues to promote delegitimization, foreign 
protests of Israel’s policies vis-à-vis its Arab minority 
should be examined on the merits of their essence 
and affiliation. It should be examined whether the 
effort is aimed at a specific policy issue or is being 
directed to demonize Israel as a whole. It should also 
be examined whether the effort is being manufac-
tured to amend the policy or to reintroduce the 1948 
question as a politically debated issue on the inter-
national level. However, the reality is that, in some 
cases, political campaigns against the Israeli govern-
ment’s treatment of its non-Jewish citizens intertwine 
both logics – they aim to challenge a specific policy 
but often do so on the basis of the broader anti-
Zionist ideology. 
Partial boycott initiatives 
As examined earlier in this chapter, the BDS move-
ment uses the boycott tool first and foremost as an 
instrument to brand Israel as a pariah state. Different 
from the full boycott strategy, in the last decade we 
have witnessed a growing number of initiatives 
calling for a partial boycott – which aims at Israel’s 
presence beyond the 1967 lines. The two main exam-
ples are boycotts of goods made in the settlements 
and boycotts of Israeli and foreign companies in-
volved in Israel’s activities in the West Bank. These 
calls serve as one of the main forms of protest against 
Israel’s ongoing occupation and settlement policy 
today.99 In this context, it is important to distinguish 
 
98 See note 63. 
99 See, for example, United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil, “Database Pursuant Human Rights Council Resolution 
31/36,” https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Regular 
between boycotts of Israel’s presence within the oc-
cupied territories and efforts to differentiate the occu-
pied territories from Israel. Differentiation efforts – 
such as the European Commission instruction (fol-
lowing the European Parliament decision in 2015) to 
differentiate Israeli products made the settlements 
from other Israeli products – do not pertain to the 
proposed definition of partial boycotts. 
At first glance, the partial boycott policy can be 
seen as a clear example of a measured method of 
criticism of Israeli policy. By focusing solely on Israeli 
settlements and businesses in the occupied territories, 
the supporters of these initiatives are protesting the 
Israeli policy of occupation while seemingly differen-
tiating Israeli policy from the matter of Israel’s exist-
ence. 
Considering the initiators’ agenda 
and the associative meaning of 
boycotts as a political tool, partial 
boycotts can become a method to 
delegitimize Israel as a whole. 
Nevertheless, partial boycotts can become a method 
to delegitimize Israel as a whole. In this context, 
attention should be given both to the affiliation and 
associative impacts of these partial boycott initiatives. 
First, on the level of the partial boycott campaign’s 
motivation: A large share of the partial boycott efforts 
are initiated by the BDS movement and used as one 
tool in a set of policy campaigns aimed to delegiti-
mize Israel as a whole. In fact, recurrent statements 
by key BDS leaders demonstrate that the movement 
advocates this partial tool as a tactical means to har-
ness the support of mainstream actors (see elaborated 
discussion in the chapter “The Strategy of Blurring 
the Differences between Delegitimization and Criti-
cism,” p. 27). In this context, the partial boycott is 
often seen by BDS advocates as a “slippery slope” to 
attract critics of Israeli policy in a later phase into the 
broader campaign for the full boycott of Israel. More-
over, it could be claimed that, even if these efforts are 
ineffective, the participation of critics in BDS-initiated 
partial boycott campaigns lends momentum to a 
movement that is directly implicated in challenging 
the right of Israel to exist. Second, using political/eco-
nomic boycotts against a country is considered an 
exceptionally severe international form of pressure, 
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which was previously used mainly against some of 
the worst human right violators in modern political 
history. It could therefore be claimed that using boy-
cotts against Israel, even in limited form, conveys 
a normative message about its basic illegitimacy. It 
associates Israel with a notorious group of human 
rights violators whose international legitimacy was 
brought into question by using this particular boycott 
tool. Moreover, as described earlier in this chapter, 
the strong association of this particular tool with the 
struggle against the illegitimate South African apart-
heid regime is the main reason for its adoption by 
the delegitimization campaign in the first place 
(“methodical typecasting”). Therefore, considering the 
normative meaning associated with the boycott tool, 
some would claim that there is no such thing as a 
“partial boycott.” 
The main dilemma facing critics of Israeli policy is 
whether to treat partial boycotts as a proactive pres-
sure method against Israel’s policies or as a tool that 
(intentionally or unintentionally) contributes to the 
campaign to delegitimize Israel. One way to tackle 
this dilemma is by addressing the implications men-
tioned above – the associative meaning of the boy-
cott tool and the affiliation of boycott campaigns with 
the BDS movement, which aims to delegitimize Israel 
as a whole. At minimum, critics of Israeli policy who 
promote taking economic steps against Israel’s occu-
pation should distance themselves from the BDS 
movement and emphasize their commitment to the 
right of Israel to exist (see elaborated discussion in 
the chapter “Policy Recommendations,” p. 38). 
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Mainstreaming the delegitimization of 
Israel: Turning liberal critics into a source 
of legitimacy 
“Seven years after the Palestinian civil society call 
for BDS against Israel was launched, the global BDS 
campaign has become stronger, more widespread, 
more effective and certainly more diverse […] it is 
time to push even further into the mainstream to 
entrench Israel’s pariah status.”100 
A strategic goal of the delegiti-
mization campaign is to move 
its agenda from the margins into 
the mainstream of European 
political discourse. 
A strategic goal of the delegitimization campaign 
is to move its agenda from the margins into the main-
stream of European political discourse, with an em-
phasis on liberal-progressive circles. Rather than 
achieving drastic change overnight, mainstreaming 
the delegitimization agenda is a key component in 
the strategy that sees delegitimization as a long-term 
advocacy campaign. Rather than reaching some sud-
den tipping point, the goal is to initiate a gradual, 
slow, yet fundamental change within the Western 
liberal elites’ common discourse and mindset toward 
Israel’s basic legitimacy as a sovereign nation. On the 
practical level, this effort is aimed at turning the cam-
paign’s activities against Israel – for example, its call 
 
100 Palestinian BDS National Committee, “BDS at 7! – 
Celebrating, Reflecting and Further Mainstreaming,” BDS 
Movement, 9 July 2012, https://www.bdsmovement.net/ 
news/bds-7-celebrating-reflecting-and-further-mainstreaming 
(accessed 28 October 2019). 
for BDS or its maximalist approach toward the right 
of return – into the dominant frame of reference 
toward Israel within the liberal-progressive milieu. 
This objective places the mainstream liberal-pro-
gressive circles in Europe as a key target audience 
for the campaign. In this context, liberal-progressive 
elites and key institutions – with emphasis on aca-
demia and the human rights community101 – are 
perceived as a prime objective of influence for the 
campaign for three reasons. First, the high level of 
criticism that already exists within these groups 
toward Israel’s policies makes it more likely that this 
audience will accept the campaign’s goals in the 
future. The goal is to turn critics of policy into sup-
porters of delegitimization. Second, they are per-
ceived as potential sources of legitimacy vis-à-vis 
larger audiences – the affiliation or adoption of the 
delegitimization agenda by known bastions of liberal 
political thought and human rights organizations 
could increase its credibility in the eyes of the general 
public.102 Third, due to the institutional status within 
policy circles, they are also perceived as a potential 
 
101 See, for example, the call of the US Campaign for the 
Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel for all US faculty, 
administrators, students, and staff “to uphold the academic 
boycott of Israel by refusing participation in Study Abroad 
programs in Israel.” US Campaign for the Academic and 
Cultural Boycott of Israel, “We Will not Study in Israel until 
Palestinians Can Return: Boycott Study Abroad in Israel!” 
https://usacbi.org/boycott-study-abroad-in-israel/#pledge 
(accessed 23 December 2019). 
102 The Reut Institute, “The Assault on Israel’s Legitimacy: 
London As a Case Study” (Tel Aviv, 19 December 2010), 
http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId= 
3949 (accessed 21 April 2020). 
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platform of influence within the political and social 
milieu in the West.103 
The delegitimization campaign’s strategy 
of blurring as a method 
In the last decade, a core strategy of the delegitimiza-
tion campaign to mainstream its agenda has been to 
blur the differences between criticism of Israeli policy 
and challenges to Israel’s basic legitimacy. This policy 
is led by two logics: first, the attempt to mobilize the 
wide and diverse groups of critics of Israeli policy into 
the delegitimization campaign; second, it is meant 
to “legitimize delegitimization,” that is, to gradually 
incorporate items of the delegitimization agenda into 
the mainstream discussion by affiliating them with 
current campaigns that criticize Israeli policies. 
The blurring strategy appears in three main aspects 
of delegitimization advocacy efforts – on the level 
of operational choices, public policy, and discursive 
trends. In this context, one of the notable adaptive 
users of this strategy in the last decade has been the 
BDS movement. 
Operational choices: The BDS movement’s 
open-tent approach as a tactical tool to 
mobilize critics 
In the last decade, the ambition to appeal to the 
mainstream has driven the BDS movement leaders to 
adopt an open-tent approach that accepts, and even 
encourages, the incorporation of a broader range 
of political views in the movement’s activities. This 
includes critics of Israeli policy, and in some cases 
even left-wing Zionists. 
The inclusion of policy critics in the 
BDS movement’s activities is often 
described by the movement’s leaders 
as a tactical maneuver aimed at 
increasing its outreach. 
The inclusion of political groups that do not con-
cur with the delegitimization campaign’s overarching 
 
103 Nathan Thrall, “BDS: How a Controversial Non-violent 
Movement Has Transformed the Israeli-Palestinian Debate,” 
The Guardian, 14 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
news/2018/aug/14/bds-boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement- 
transformed-israeli-palestinian-debate (accessed 21 April 2020). 
anti-Zionist goals has been a topic of discussion with-
in the BDS movement. This lively discussion demon-
strates the importance that the movement gives to 
gaining support among mainstream critics. In this 
context, the inclusion of policy critics in the move-
ment’s activities is often described by the movement’s 
leaders as a tactical maneuver aimed at increasing its 
outreach. BDS activist Ahmed Moor argues that “[t]he 
movement may be burgeoning but remains too small. 
Why shouldn’t we indulge in ad-hoc partnerships to 
get things done? […] many self-proclaimed Zionists 
have done an immeasurably positive amount of work 
in skinning the Zionist cat […] shouldn’t they be 
asked to join the BDS movement? If it came down to 
it, I’d be happy to work with the racist up the street 
to get the city to fix a neighborhood pothole.”104 The 
same tactical open-tent approach also appears in the 
position of British Committee for Universities of 
Palestine: “While some Israelis do employ the term 
colonialism or apartheid, they limit these terms’ 
applications to the Palestinian territory occupied in 
1967, not to Historic Palestine […] we believe that this 
formulation vindicates one aspect of the logic of the 
BDS movement […] [nevertheless] such Israeli support 
for BDS cannot be ignored and is to be welcomed.”105 
The practical implication of the BDS movement’s 
open-tent approach can be found in the changing 
attitude toward partial boycotts (mostly directed at 
settlement goods only). The movement’s official call 
for boycotts tends to avoid distinguishing between 
Israel within the 1967 lines and Israel’s occupation. 
However, its focus during the last decade has been 
mostly directed at the more popular method of the 
partial boycott of goods from settlements. Despite 
the inconsistency of the partial boycott tool with the 
movement’s overarching goals, the leaders of the 
movement seem to acknowledge its potential appeal 
to broader audiences and accept it as a “necessary 
compromise” to promote the movement’s goals with-
in mainstream audiences. Omar Barghouti, for exam-
ple, views BDS as a “comprehensive boycott of Israel, 
including all its products, academic and cultural in-
stitutions, etc.” but shows flexibility for “the tactical 
 
104 Ahmed Moor, “BDS Is a Long-term Project with Radically 
Transformative Potential,” Mondoweiss, 22 August 2010, 
https://mondoweiss.net/2010/04/bds-is-a-long-term-project-
with-radically-transformative-potential/ (accessed 28 October 
2019). 
105 BDS Movement, “BDS and the Israeli Left,” 16 Septem-
ber 2009, https://bdsmovement.net/news/bds-and-israeli-left 
(accessed 28 October 2019). 
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needs of our partners to carry out a selective boycott 
of settlement products […] as the easiest way to rally 
support.”106 
In addition, some BDS supporters also describe the 
partial boycott campaign as a stepping stone that can 
be used later to convince critics to support the over-
arching goals of the movement – hence to challenge 
Israel’s basic legitimacy rather than to only focus on 
its policies.107 
Tactical obscurity: Duality of discourses 
regarding the campaign’s radical goals 
A key aspect of the strategy of blurring is the tactic of 
obscurity that is displayed in public by key speakers 
of the campaign in regard to their strategic vision – 
hence the demise of Israel as a sovereign nation. This 
is done to avoid alienating policy critics or discourag-
ing them from joining the campaign’s activities. This 
tactic is sometimes apparent in the difference in tone 
taken by the campaign’s key figures on internal 
panels and the line of argument they display in pub-
lic media. Whereas on internal panels, the goal of 
seeing Israel’s demise serves as an explicit rallying 
call, in public media they adopt a more ambiguous 
approach regarding the movement’s overall goals and 
often refrain from speaking of their opposition to 
Israel’s right to exist. 
This duality of discourses is apparent in the BDS 
movement’s public policy approach. The BDS move-
ment’s positions and the statements made by its 
leaders leave very little doubt that its call is aimed at 
challenging Israel’s legitimacy, rather than resisting 
Israeli occupation. Nevertheless, in interviews aimed 
at wider progressive circles, the movement’s leaders 
present a pluralistic approach regarding the desired 
solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead 
of presenting their stated goal of challenging Israel’s 
right to exist, they tend to either rely on subjective 
terms such as “justice” or, in accordance with the 
open-tent approach, abstain from prescribing a spe-
cific solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question. For 
example, in an interview on September 2009 with 
the progressive Jewish publication The Forward, Omar 
 
106 Gal Beckerman, “Palestinian-Led Movement to Boycott 
Israel Is Gaining Support,” Forward, 16 September 2009, 
https://forward.com/news/114212/palestinian-led-movement-
to-boycott-israel-is-gain/ (accessed 28 October 2019). 
107 Reut Institute, “The BDS Movement Promotes Delegiti-
mization of the State of Israel” (see note 67). 
Barghouti stated that the BDS movement “does not 
adopt a particular political solution. […] The main 
strategy is based on the principle that human rights 
and international law must be upheld and respected 
no matter what the political solution may be.”108 
Nevertheless, in interviews and internal debates 
within the delegitimization campaign, key leaders 
of the BDS movement present a much clearer vision 
regarding their opposition to Israel’s right to exist as 
a Jewish state. In an interview given to the radical 
news site Mondoweiss, BDS activist Ahmed Moor pre-
sents the clear goals of the movement: “So BDS does 
mean the end of the Jewish state […] I view the BDS 
movement as a long-term project with radically trans-
formative potential […] the success of the BDS move-
ment is tied directly to our success in humanizing 
Palestinians and discrediting Zionism as a legitimate 
way of regarding the world.”109 Haidar Eid, a promi-
nent member of the Palestinian Campaign for the 
Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel from Gaza, 
listed as his “new year resolutions” for 2019: “Liberate 
Palestine, Move to Haifa, Write a book on the defeat 
of Zionism, another book on the knockout victory of 
the BDS movement, tour the Zionism museum with 
foreign friends.”110 Far from being a dove within a 
radical movement, Barghouti himself has stated: 
“A Jewish State in any shape or form could nothing 
but contradict the basic right of the Palestinian indig-
enous population […] no Palestinian, a rational Pales-
tinian, not a sell-out, will ever accept a Jewish State 
in Palestine.”111 American academic Virginia Tilley 
referred to the actual goals of the BDS movement 
in an article published on the Scottish PSC website: 
“A coordinated movement of BDS against Israel must 
convene to contain not only Israel’s aggressive acts 
 
108 Gal Beckerman, “Palestinian-Led Movement to Boycott 
Israel Is Gaining Support,” Forward, 16 September 2009, 
https://forward.com/news/114212/palestinian-led-movement-
to-boycott-israel-is-gain/ (accessed 28 October 2019). 
109 Mondoweiss, 22 April 2010, as in: Reut Institute, 
“The BDS Movement Promotes Delegitimization against 
Israel” (Tel Aviv, 13 June 2010), http://www.reut-institute. 
org/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=3868 (accessed 23 De-
cember 2019). 
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https://twitter.com/haidareid/status/1079610931573854208 
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and crimes against humanitarian law but also, as 
in South Africa, its founding racist logics […]”.112 
One tactic often used by the campaign to lower 
the profile of its anti-Zionist goals could be dubbed as 
“putting 67 at the forefront, and 48 in the fine print.” 
The campaign recognizes the importance of the 
struggle against Israeli occupation as a standing issue 
among Western liberal circles. Therefore, the cam-
paign attempts to use issues related to Israel’s occu-
pation as an initial “hook” for mobilization, and 
to connect them in a later phase to the question of 
Israel’s basic legitimacy. For example, PSC presents 
“ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine” and 
“peace and justice for everyone living in the region” 
at top of the initiative’s aims.113 Nevertheless, a closer 
examination of the detailed list of aims presented 
by the organization (seven items) reveals its stated 
opposition to “the apartheid and Zionist nature 
of the Israeli state.” The official call for BDS starts 
with the standing issues of the “Wall of Separation” 
and the annexation of territories occupied during 
the 1967 war, and only later describes Israel as a 
colonialist state and presents the demand for the 
physical return of refugees within pre-1967 Israel.114 
Hence, the international protest against the occupa-
tion is turned into a solid platform to present claims 
about Israel’s illegitimacy as a nation. 
Discursive choices of articulation: 
Conflating the semantic fields of 
occupation and colonialization 
“The BDS movement does not adopt a 
particular political solution to the colonial 
conflict […]” 
Omar Barghouti115 
One aspect of the campaign’s effort to change the 
Western mindset regarding Israel’s legitimacy is the 
precipitation of a gradual change in the common 
discourse regarding Israel.  
 
112 Reut Institute, “The BDS Movement Promotes Delegiti-
mization of the State of Israel” (see note 67). 
113 Palestine Solidarity Campaign, “About,” https://www. 
palestinecampaign.org/about/ (accessed 28 October 2019). 
114 Palestinian Civil Society, “Palestinian Civil Society Call 
for BDS” (see note 68). 
115 Gal Beckerman, “Palestinian-Led Movement to Boycott 
Israel Is Gaining Support,” Forward, 16 September 2009, 
https://forward.com/news/114212/palestinian-led-movement-
to-boycott-israel-is-gain/ (accessed 23 December 2019). 
In an attempt to create a “semantic 
spillover,” key speakers of the cam-
paign juxtapose common terms 
and concepts from the discourse 
of criticism against Israeli policy, 
with terms taken from the delegiti-
mization discourse. 
In an attempt to create a “semantic spillover,” key 
speakers of the campaign juxtapose common terms 
and concepts from the discourse of criticism against 
Israeli policy, such as occupation, expropriation, or 
discrimination, with terms taken from the delegitimi-
zation discourse, such as colonialization, apartheid, 
ethnic cleansing, and genocide. 
This semantic trend is more than simply a confu-
sion in terms – but a discursive policy meant to in-
corporate items and perspectives that question Israel’s 
basic legitimacy into the mainstream political dis-
cussion about Israel. This policy is mostly effective 
with first-time activists or unexperienced audiences 
that lack the capacity to differentiate between the 
nuances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict jargon or 
to identify the broader political agenda they wish to 
promote. Moreover, working with grassroots activ-
ists – for whom the Israeli-Palestinian topic is only 
one of many causes – the introduction of delegitimi-
zation terminology as a component of the criticism 
of Israel’s policies enables the campaign to install 
their claims in these groups’ formal positions. 
In this context, the BDS movement serves as a 
main interface to introduce critics of Israeli occupa-
tion policy with the delegitimization discourse and 
reopen the 1948 file. Sami Hermez, an anti-Zionist 
academic, writes that “BDS enables a discourse that 
moves beyond ‘ending the occupation’ to place 
demands for the right of return and equal rights for 
Palestinians in Israel as top priorities.”116 The leader-
ship of the BDS campaign frequently employs this 
intended confusion in terms. On the BDS’s call to 
“end the occupation and colonization of all Arab 
lands and dismantling the Wall,” the speakers mash 
together popular policy-related issues (ending occu-
pation, dismantling the wall) with a concept that 
challenges Israel’s basic legitimacy (the colonization 
of all Arab lands). This approach can be seen as an 
 
116 Sami Hermez, “Answering Critics of the Boycott 
Movement,” electronic intifada, 1 October 2009, https:// 
electronicintifada.net/content/answering-critics-boycott-
movement/8470 (accessed 2 December 2019). 
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attempt to appeal to critics of the Israeli occupation, 
or even a broader attempt – to redefine the topic 
of occupation as a matter relating to the colonialist 
nature of the Zionist project. The same intended 
mixture of terms appears in the BDS movement’s 
description of Israel as a “regime of settler colonial-
ism, apartheid and occupation over the Palestinian 
people,” which juxtaposes different terms from dif-
ferent political contexts in order to create the impres-
sion that they are interlinked. 
The Israeli right-wing trend of blurring 
the differences: A political tool to de-
legitimize foreign and domestic criticism 
The delegitimization campaign is often used by Israeli 
right-wing actors as an advocacy tool to undermine 
international as well as domestic criticism of the 
Israeli government’s policies. The growing attention 
both in Israel and the international community to 
delegitimization activity (with emphasis on the BDS 
campaign) provides these actors with the context to 
portray acts of criticism as anti-Zionism, and in some 
cases even as anti-Semitism.117 
One illustrative example is the Israeli government’s 
response to the European Commission instruction 
(following the European Parliament decision in 2015) 
to differentiate Israeli products made in the settle-
ments from other Israeli products. Despite the in-
struction of the European Union (EU) bearing no 
relation to the BDS campaign or to delegitimization, 
it was presented by government officials as a “step 
which is bound to strengthen the radical actors pro-
moting the boycott of Israel and denying its right to 
exist […]” Moreover, some officials introduced it not 
only as “anti-Israeli,” but also as “anti-Jewish,” allud-
ing to the Nazi labeling of Jewish products in the 
1930s.118 Another recent example was the govern-
 
117 The author does not wish to take a position on 
the ongoing debate regarding the relation between anti-
Semitism and anti-Zionism. The claim that denying people 
the right to self-determination constitutes a form of racism 
against them deserves a separate discussion. Nevertheless, 
it is the author’s position that not all supporters, let alone 
participants, in delegitimization activities are in fact moti-
vated by anti-Semitism. 
118 Itamar Eichler, “‘simẇn mẇṣårym – kmŵ ṭlaʾ y 
ṣåhob’. haqrab hayiśraʾ eliy be ʾ yiropåh” (translation: “Prod-
uct marking – like a yellow badge.” The Israeli battle in 
Europe), ynet, 3 November 2015, https://www.ynet.co.il/ 
ment’s response to the Airbnb decision (2019 – later 
reversed) to remove listings in Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank, which had no relation to the BDS 
movement or the delegitimization campaign. Never-
theless, the decision was described by Israeli officials 
as a “wretched capitulation” to the BDS movement, 
and the company was threatened with legal action 
in the United States.119 
Framing international criticism of the Israeli gov-
ernment’s policy as delegitimization also plays a role 
in the government’s public policy vis-à-vis the Israeli 
audience. Utilizing the Israeli public’s preoccupation 
with delegitimization, some Israeli right-wing actors 
are attempting to blur the lines between cause and 
effect regarding Israeli policies and Europe’s negative 
reactions; they instead claim this reaction is due to 
an intrinsic European animosity toward Israel. Recent 
polls suggest that this public policy line has been suc-
cessful. When asked to assess the cause for global 
criticism of Israel, 59 percent of the respondents men-
tioned “basic hostility toward Israel” as the main 
factor, and only 34 percent related it to disagreements 
with the Israeli government’s policy.120 
Utilization of the anti-delegitimization 
campaign to silence domestic criticism of 
governmental policy 
In the last decade, Israeli politicians and activists on 
the right have used the public perception of delegiti-
mization as a strategic threat to Israel in order to de-
legitimize domestic opposition from the left. In the 
process, far right organizations have attempted 
to brand left-wing critics as intentional or negligent 
collaborators in the global campaign against Israel’s 
legitimacy. 
 
articles/0,7340,L-4720549,00.html (accessed 28 October 
2019). 
119 Dan Williams, “Airbnb to Remove Listings in Israel’s 
West Bank Settlements,” Reuters, 19 November 2018, https:// 
reut.rs/2xvxIYY (accessed 21 April 2020). 
120 Mitvim, The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim 
Institute (Ramat Gan: Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for 
Regional Foreign Policies, November 2017), https://go.aws/ 
35qUttM (accessed 24 October 2019). 
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Israeli left-leaning NGOS’s are often 
described by right-wing actors as 
a “fifth column” – a tool of 
foreign intervention – aimed at 
weakening Israel’s resilience by 
slandering it abroad. 
The main target of this campaign has been Israel’s 
civil society – left leaning human rights and advocacy 
NGOs. They are often described as a “fifth column” – 
a tool of foreign intervention – aimed at weakening 
Israel’s resilience by slandering it abroad. Far-right 
speakers often focus on these organizations’ activities 
on the international stage to justify public and legal 
action against them under the title of fighting delegiti-
mization. For example, in 2015, the head of the right-
wing organization Im Tirtzu, Ronen Shoval, called the 
Israeli prime minister to declare the left-wing advo-
cacy group “Breaking the Silence” an illegal organiza-
tion because of its “intensive promotion of delegiti-
mization of Israel in various international arenas.”121 
This call was part of the “undercover” (“shtulim”) nar-
rative of Im Tirtzu, which asserted that some Israeli 
NGOs in the field of human rights were actually serv-
ing as foreign propaganda tools to “weaken the Israeli 
society and Israel’s ability to defend itself …” 
In the last few years, governmental backing for 
these claims has been a source of controversy, both 
in Israel and within the international community. 
Two pieces of legislation related to the topic stood 
at the center of attention. The first was the NGO 
Transparency Law (2016), requiring NGOs that are 
mainly funded by foreign governments to declare 
their source of funding in public and political appeals 
as well as in media campaigns. Beyond the practical 
burden it puts on NGOs, the law also enhances the 
narrative that Israeli NGOs serve foreign entities and 
explicitly contribute to the delegitimization campaign 
against Israel.122 The second is an amendment to a 
previous law from 2017, which allows for refusing 
entrance of BDS activists into Israel and the Palestin-
ian territories. This amendment has been challenged 
by the political left and center as part of an overarch-
 
121 Shlomo Zasane, “ʿ amutot haštẇliym” (translation: 
Planted organizations), israel hayom, 14 December 2015, 
https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/338531 (accessed 
28 October 2019). 
122 “Notes of the Knesset,” Knesset, 25 May 2016, https:// 
m.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press250516n.aspx 
(accessed 28 October 2019). 
ing political attack on the freedom of expression 
and the pluralism of Israel’s civil society. Other critics 
focused on the ineffectiveness of such measures and 
the damage they do to Israel’s democratic image.123 
The controversy revolves around two principle 
topics. First, it relates to the claim that the government 
is willing to challenge some of Israel’s democratic 
values in the effort to fight delegitimization. Actions 
such as preventing the entrance of tourists or pro-
hibiting governmental funding to cultural forums are 
all claimed to challenge basic democratic rights in the 
name of fighting against delegitimization. Second, it 
relates to the government’s position on the question 
of who can be defined as a delegitimization supporter? 
The Israeli government is often criticized for politiciz-
ing delegitimization by adopting a broad interpreta-
tion of the term and applying it to left-leaning Israeli 
NGOs.124 It can be argued that this approach further 
limits the already shrinking spaces for civil society’s 
criticism in Israel. 
 
123 Michal Hatuel-Radushitzki, “ʾ åz måh ʾ im hen ‘ʾ anṭi-
šemiyŵt’ – tnẇ lahȩn lhikånes” (translation: So what if 
they are “anti-Semitic” – let them in), ynet, 24 July 2019, 
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5556431,00.html 
(accessed 28 October 2019). 
124 See, for example, the campaign against the New Israel 
Fund (NIF), which was based on the claim that NIF promotes 
the “systematic delegitimization of Israel” because, among 
its beneficiaries, one can find organizations supporting BDS 
and other items of delegitimization. This is despite the fact 
that the NIF cut its ties with organizations involved in de-
legitimization. 
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The proposed typology distinguishes between four 
different ideal-type categories of political actors in 
an attempt to discern not only between critics and 
“delegitimizers,” but also mainly between different 
types of parties supporting the delegitimization 
agenda. In this context, this proposed framework 
differentiates between involvement in explicit delegiti-
mization and implicit delegitimization. This terminology 
relates to the actual role that delegitimization activity 
plays in the ideological agenda and practical work 
of an organization. Explicit delegitimization is a pre-
meditated attempt to promote items of delegitimi-
zation as part of the agent’s core agenda. Implicit 
delegitimization pertains to a general support for 
different aspects of the delegitimization campaign, 
which is often motivated by in-group pressure to 
conform rather than a genuine commitment to the 
campaign’s goals. 
Dealing with ideal typecasts, this typology hardly 
covers the wide range of different organizations, 
initiatives, and advocacy groups involved with the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the region and on the 
international level. Nevertheless, this typology aims 
to provide a basis to develop an engagement policy 
vis-à-vis these organizations (see next chapter), by dis-
tinguishing between the nature of their criticism and 
the level of their contribution to delegitimization 
activity. 
Category A: Illegal/violent anti-Zionists 
This category pertains to elements within the delegiti-
mization campaign that are affiliated with – or serve 
as liaisons to – terrorist organizations,125 promote 
illegal content, or are involved in promoting violent 
actions against Israel and Israelis. This category 
relates to two types of organizations. 
The first type concerns the affiliates of terrorist 
organizations. Most notable in this context are 
Hamas’s affiliates in Europe. As described in the sec-
tion “The delegitimization campaign – main cata-
lysts and organizational logic” (p. 13), a key aspect of 
Hamas’s adoption of delegitimization as a strategy 
is the increase in its activity in Europe through a set 
of affiliated and linked organizations. The PRC and 
Muhammad Sawalha were presented in this paper 
as key examples of hubs of delegitimization that are 
accused of supporting and, some claim, representing 
Hamas’s interests in Europe. The PRC is active in Ger-
many and has held its main annual event, the “Pales-
tinians in Europe Conference,” twice in Berlin (2010 
and 2015).126 This category also includes organiza-
tions and individuals from the delegitimization cam-
paign who provide direct funding to illegal organiza-
tions such as Hamas. 
The second type relates to those involved in acts of 
classic anti-Semitism. These are less common, as open 
anti-Semitism is perceived not only in Europe, but 
 
125 The definition is based on German and EU legal desig-
nations. 
126 Palestinians in Europe Conference, “Final Statement: 
the 13th Palestinians in Europe Conference – Berlin, Ger-
many,” al-awda, 1 May 2015, http://www.alawda.eu/index. 
php/en/the-conference/3837-final-statement-the-13th-
palestinians-in-europe-conference-berlin-germany (accessed 
28 October 2019). 
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also by the majority of Palestinian and Arab civil 
society actors, as a damaging practice. Nevertheless, 
these acts include not only open references, but also 
the presentation of narratives and terms that are his-
torically connected to anti-Semitic propaganda, in 
relation to the “Zionists” and Israel.127 
The connecting thread between these two types of 
actors is their attempt to utilize the growing popularity 
of the delegitimization campaign to promote their 
extreme agendas. 
Category B: Non-violent initiators of 
delegitimization 
This category relates to organizations involved in ex-
plicit delegitimization. Organizations belonging to 
this category could be plainly described as initiators 
of delegitimization activity or active promoters of its 
agenda on the international level. This relates to orga-
nizations whose sole or main purpose is to promote 
the delegitimization of Israel or any of the main items 
of the delegitimization agenda described in the opera-
tional definition of delegitimization in the chapter 
“Unpacking Delegitimization” (p. 18). In some cases, 
these organizations openly challenge Israel’s legiti-
macy as a sovereign nation. In others, they leave 
space for ambiguity regarding their aims, but directly 
promote items of the delegitimization agenda. 
Category C: Implicit adopters/supporters 
of delegitimization activity 
This relates to organizations that adopt one or more 
items of the delegitimization agenda as part of their 
general policy – but their core activity does not 
relate to promoting delegitimization. This adoption/ 
support could appear in the form of an official state-
ment of support or through a decision to create 
strategic ties with known hubs of delegitimization. 
As such, these organizations are involved in implicit 
 
127 See, for example, the common claim among these 
circles of a “global Zionist conspiracy” to control world 
leaders, or the claim that Israel has been involved in killing 
Palestinian children to harvest their organs – all known 
historical narratives used for centuries to demonize Jews. 
See “Belgian Official: Israel Steals Organs of Palestinian 
Kids,” presstv, 21 October 2018, https://www.presstv.com/ 
detail/2018/10/21/577649/israel-organ-harvesting-belgian-
official (accessed 28 October 2019). 
delegitimization. They do not promote delegitimiza-
tion as part of their organizational vision, but their 
cumulative support provides the campaign with the 
critical mass of support it needs to become a central 
political actor. This category is especially relevant in 
the case of Palestinian civil society, where the domi-
nance of delegitimization and the BDS movement 
often makes supporting them a necessity for political 
inclusion. 
The current climate of hostility toward Israel with-
in Palestinian society often makes it hard to distin-
guish between explicit initiators and implicit sup-
porters of delegitimization (categories B and C). One 
issue of controversy is whether the personal involve-
ment of key representatives within an organization 
in explicit delegitimization should reflect on the 
designation of their organization. 
Category D: Responsible critics 
This category relates to critics of Israeli policy who 
knowingly abstain from incorporating items of de-
legitimization into their agenda. They do this, for 
example, by abstaining from supporting BDS or by 
abstaining from using a discourse of demonization in 
their criticism of Israel. Defining actors as “responsible 
critics” does not reflect the tone of their criticism. Crit-
ics of Israeli policy – no matter how harsh their criti-
cism is – should be considered a valid component of 
the constructive discussion over the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, just as long as their criticism does not enter 
the realm of challenging Israel’s basic legitimacy. 
Within this group of responsible critics, a special 
emphasis should be given to a rare but important 
group of organizations that openly draw a distinction 
between their policy of criticism and delegitimiza-
tion. In this context, there is a relative lack of dis-
cussion within the Western human rights community 
regarding the need to separate criticism from delegiti-
mization. This effort to distinguish is mostly asso-
ciated with advocacy groups from the Jewish progres-
sive camp or within Israel’s civil society. One example 
is T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, which 
is a North American network of cantors and a vocal 
critic of Israel’s policy in the West Bank. The organi-
zation’s official policy clearly distances itself from the 
BDS movement.128 In addition, the organization took 
 
128 “Our Positions and Policies,” truah, https://www. 
truah.org/positions/ (accessed 28 October 2019). 
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a clear stand against the definition – created on a 
platform published by the Black Lives Matter move-
ment – of Israeli occupation as “genocide,” while 
confirming their strong support of the movement’s 
goals.129 This differentiation represents a clear effort 
by a progressive organization to confront the growing 
trend of using the discourse of delegitimization with-
in its milieu without softening the tone of its criti-
cism.130 
In the process of constructive differentiation, different 
organizations present different views on the per-
ceived boundaries between criticism and delegitimi-
zation. Nevertheless, the important feature of these 
efforts is the attempt to deal with the contemporary 
political conundrum of critics of Israeli policy in the 
era of delegitimization – how to promote assertive 
criticism of Israel without supporting deconstructive 
agendas. 
 
129 “Statement on Black Lives Matter Platform” (see note 41). 
130 Another example is Jstreet’s (a progressive advocacy 
group that has been a strong supporter of the two-state solu-
tion and a critic of the current Israeli government’s policies) 
decision in 2018 to publicly withdraw its endorsement for 
Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib because of her rejection of 
the two-state solution. See Allison Kaplan Sommer, “J Street 
Withdraws Support for Rashida Tlaib over Refusal to En-
dorse Two-state Solution,” haaretz, 17 August 2018, https:// 
www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-j-street-withdraws-
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The international delegitimization campaign negates 
two core principles of European Middle East policy. 
First, as a campaign devised to bring about the col-
lapse of Israel’s political model, it stands in direct 
contradiction to the core commitment adopted by 
European nations and the EU to Israel’s right to exist 
as a Jewish and democratic nation.131 In this context, 
in the current state of affairs, delegitimization can 
hardly be considered an imminent threat to Israel’s 
existence or its political and economic resilience. 
The campaign has so far had very limited success 
in changing the global mindset about Israel on the 
political leadership level or in the general public. 
Nevertheless, the campaign has had some success 
in changing the common discourse within liberal-
progressive circles in the West. These changes in 
discourse and mindset do not mean that these actors 
necessarily adopt the campaign’s call to treat Israel 
as a pariah state. Rather they demonstrate a new will-
ingness within these circles to even consider Israel’s 
basic legitimacy as a valid issue for debate. As liberal-
progressive institutions such as academia and human 
rights organizations serve as a breeding ground for 
the future generation of Western political leadership, 
 
131 See, for example, the German commitment to a 
“Jewish and democratic state” in Koalitionsvertrag zwischen 
CDU, CSU und SPD, Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa, eine neue 
Dynamik für Deutschland, ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land 
(Berlin, 2018), 151, https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/ 
dokumente/koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf?file=1 (accessed 23 
December 2019). The EU’s commitment to Israel’s right to 
exist has been a recurrent item in the European Parliament 
president’s speeches over the years. See, for example, Times 
of Israel, “Full Text of European Parliament President’s 
Speech to Knesset,” Times of Israel, 12 February 2014, https:// 
www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-european-parliament-
presidents-speech-to-knesset/ (accessed 21 April 2020). 
these changes carry the long-term potential to under-
mine Israel’s political legitimacy in the future. Weak 
signals of this gradual change are already apparent 
in the positions and narratives presented by the new 
progressive milieu, within which challenges to the 
Jewish right to self-determination are becoming ever 
more apparent.132 
Second, the delegitimization campaign serves as 
a long-term obstacle to European efforts to promote a 
mutually agreed-upon solution to the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict.133 In this context, much of the attention 
had been given to the campaign’s influence on the 
economic or political resilience of Israel. 
As a perceived success story, the 
campaign is shaping the positions of a 
new generation of Palestinian leaders 
toward rejectionism and opposition 
to the two-state solution. 
However, the main deconstructive, long-term effect 
of the campaign can be found in its impact on the po-
sitions of a new generation of political and civil society 
leaders within the occupied territories. As a narrative, 
 
132 One prominent example is the progressive wing of the 
Democratic Party in the United States, where the delegitimi-
zation agenda is slowly becoming a valid part of the political 
discussion about the party’s Middle East policy. Another ex-
ample is the position adopted by key members of the Black 
Lives Matter movement regarding the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, and specifically a platform published by the movement 
accusing Israel of “genocide.” See Mazin Sidahmed, “Critics 
Denounce Black Lives Matter Platform Accusing Israel of 
‘Genocide,’” The Guardian, 11 August 2016, https://bit.ly/ 
3c4Pr8S (accessed 28 October 2019). 
133 See European Union External Action Service, “Middle 
East Peace Process” (see note 72). 
The Delegitimization Cam-
paign As a Challenge to Euro-
pean Foreign Policy Principles 
 The Delegitimization Campaign As a Challenge to European Foreign Policy Principles 
 SWP Berlin 
 Unpacking the Global Campaign to Delegitimize Israel 
 June 2020 
 37 
delegitimization serves as a catalyst for radicalization 
in public positions, and specifically in the positions 
of Palestinian civil society regarding the concept of 
mutual agreement with Israel. It promotes rejection-
ism as an alternative paradigm to the long-standing 
European approach of negotiated solution along the 
lines of the two-state framework. Despite its limited 
success, in the last two decades the delegitimization 
campaign has gained the image of a success story 
from the perspective of the Palestinians – an effec-
tive instrument of resistance in a region where the 
traditional methods have failed to yield results. 
Related campaigns such as the BDS movement are 
presented as a central pillar in the 21st century Pales-
tinian resistance culture.134 Therefore, the delegiti-
mization campaign serves as an emerging strategic 
narrative that will affect the mindset and long-term 
thinking of the future Palestinian leadership for years 
to come. 
 
134 See, for example, Thrall, “BDS: How a Controversial 
Non-violent Movement Has Transformed the Israeli-Pales-
tinian Debate” (see note 103). The campaign’s influence on 
the growing rejectionism also appears in its involvement in 
the campaign of anti-normalization with Israel and Israelis. 
See, for example, Haidar Eid, “Words without Borders ‘Dia-
logue’ Violates Palestinian Boycott Call,” electronic intifada, 
9 August 2010, https://electronicintifada.net/content/words-
without-borders-dialogue-violates-palestinian-boycott-call/ 
8971 (accessed 21 April 2020). 
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This chapter aims to tackle the delegitimization cam-
paign’s strategy (which is also utilized by certain po-
litical actors in Israel) of blurring the differences 
between criticism of Israel’s policy and challenging 
its basic legitimacy. For this purpose, the chapter 
offers a framework of constructive differentiation 
between criticism and delegitimization. The frame-
work includes a set of practical guidelines, which are 
partially based on the typology of critics presented 
in the previous chapter. It is designed to enable an 
effective space for criticism of Israeli policy that is 
devoid of efforts to delegitimize Israel. 
The framework of constructive differentiation is 
designed to tackle the dilemmas presented by the 
delegitimization campaign to both governmental and 
non-governmental members of the European foreign 
policy community. Therefore, it includes two clusters 
of recommendations aimed at two main audiences: 
first, critics of Israeli policy from within the European 
civil society/human rights community who do not 
consider themselves anti-Zionists; second, European 
civil society and political actors (e.g., German politi-
cal foundations) that are currently engaged with the 
Palestinian/Arab world. 
Maintaining the integrity of critical 
voices: Applying responsibility in 
discourse and action when criticizing 
Israel’s policy 
Opposing other nations’ policies and promoting in-
ternational pressure to confront them is not only a 
legitimate but also a constructive aspect of civil soci-
ety’s role within a democratic society. Nevertheless, 
in an era when criticism of Israel’s policy is often 
utilized by the delegitimization campaign to promote 
their own political goals, the careful articulation and 
contextualization of criticism become even more 
vital. The challenge for critics is therefore to preserve 
the ability to oppose items of Israeli policy without 
unintentionally providing victories to the delegitimi-
zation campaign. This challenge becomes ever more 
important considering the campaign’s direct effort 
to influence the mainstream of public debate. In such 
circumstances, differentiation is crucial, not only 
to prevent the delegitimization of Israel, but also to 
preserve the integrity of the criticism of Israeli policy 
as a constructive form of political action. Upsetting 
this effort requires critics of Israel to assume respon-
sibility in both official discourse and action. 
Responsibility in discourse entails abstaining from 
using terms borrowed from the discourse of delegiti-
mization, which could contribute to the perceived 
demonization of Israel. A comparison between Israeli 
occupation and the apartheid regime could be per-
ceived as a viable form of protest against Israeli occu-
pation policy. However, when presented against the 
backdrop of a broad global campaign to demonize 
Israel as the new apartheid regime, using these terms 
could easily provide unintended momentum for the 
delegitimization campaign. Facing the ongoing cam-
paign’s effort to promote a discursive shift in the debate 
regarding Israel, the cautious usage of terminology 
when criticizing Israel carries a special importance. 
Responsibility in action relates mainly to two dif-
ferent types of choice organizations make. First, it 
relates to European NGOs’ general engagement policy 
with civil society and political actors involved with 
the conflict (e.g., providing funding and tangible sup-
port). Recommendations regarding this type of activ-
ity is the topic of the next section of this chapter. Sec-
ond, it relates to European NGOs’ direct involvement 
in campaigns aimed at protesting Israeli policies. 
In this paper, I defined a number of contested 
issues, such as participation in limited boycotts, that 
are currently being utilized by the delegitimization 
campaign to attract critics to join the campaign’s 
activities. This framework suggests applying special 
caution when participating in campaigns of criticism 
on these topics. In this context, this framework rec-
ommends the application of a double parameter to 
distinguish between campaigns that promote criti-
cism of Israel and those that promote delegitimiza-
tion. First, critics should address the associative context 
of the campaigns they choose to support. For exam-
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ple, as exemplified in the case of limited boycotts, 
they should be aware of the negative influence that 
applying certain methods has on the public’s view 
of Israel’s basic legitimacy. Second, critics should 
be aware of the organizational affiliations and overall 
policy goals of the actors leading the campaigns. In 
this context, in the last few years there seems to have 
been a constructive change among left-wing political 
actors in Germany in applying greater responsibility 
when protesting against Israel’s policy. One example 
is Die Linke’s (the Left Party of Germany) public deci-
sion to refrain from participating in an event sup-
porting the BDS movement in the European Parlia-
ment.135 Applying responsibility in action also entails 
making clear distinctions when engaging in criticism 
against Israeli policies. For example, this framework 
recommends that any initiative attempting to differ-
entiate or exclude Israeli capacities beyond the 1967 
lines will be accompanied by a clear statement em-
phasizing the legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty within 
the 1967 borders. 
Proposed guidelines for institutional 
engagement with the different types of 
critics 
Based on the typology of critics presented in the 
chapter “Four Shades of Criticism and Delegitimiza-
tion” (p. 33), the framework includes policy guide-
lines (the four E’s introduced below) for both the gov-
ernmental and non-governmental sectors for their 
engagement with organizations critical of Israel that 
are situated in Europe, within the international com-
munity, and above all in the Middle East. 
Proposed guideline for engagement with 
illegal/violent anti-Zionists: Encounter 
The EU as well as European governments should 
make an active effort to implement a zero-tolerance 
policy toward any form of anti-Zionism affiliated with 
illegal terrorist organizations or with anti-Semitism. 
This includes identifying and taking legal action 
 
135 Cornelia Ernst, Thomas Händel, Sabine Lösing, Martina 
Michels, Martin Schirdewan, Helmut Scholz, and Gabi Zim-
mer, “Gemeinsame Erklärung der Delegation Die Linke im 
EP zur GUE/NGL-Veranstaltung ‘Boycott, divestment, and 
sanctions: achievements and challenges,’” Die Linke, 3 Decem-
ber 2018, https://bit.ly/2Wnvwvd (accessed 2 December 2019). 
against affiliates of Hamas who are using the guise 
ofthe non-violent activity of the delegitimization cam-
paign to operate and promote their own agenda on 
European soil. In Hamas’s case, this policy recommen-
dation corresponds directly with its definition as an 
illegal terrorist organization by Germany and the EU.136 
Proposed guideline for engagement with 
non-violent initiators: Evade 
This framework recommends that European govern-
mental and non-governmental actors treat initiators 
of delegitimization as any other radical political 
group. It suggests applying the same measures toward 
initiators of delegitimization as they would to any 
other political advocacy group that aims to sabotage 
the concept of an agreed upon solution between 
Israel and the Palestinians. The goal is to confine the 
delegitimization campaign to the margins of political 
activity in Europe without jeopardizing basic demo-
cratic values such as the freedom of speech. 
This framework recommends that the European 
foreign policy community abstain from cooperation 
with – let alone provide support to – the initiators 
of delegitimization against Israel, whether individuals 
or organizations. It recommends engaging in an effort 
to identify and define the organizations belonging to 
this category that are active in Europe, and refrain 
from providing them governmental funding or politi-
cal support. 
Proposed guideline for engagement with 
implicit supporters: Engage assertively 
Implicit supporters of delegitimization constitute a 
key factor in the effort to confront attempts to main-
stream delegitimization. Their continuous general 
support of delegitimization is often enabled by the 
failure of international partners to hold them 
accountable for these positions. As these organiza-
tions lack a strong ideological connection to the cam-
paign’s cause, the basic assumption is that their in-
volvement in implicit delegitimization could be 
reversed through outside pressure. 
 
136 See European Council – Council of the European 
Union, “EU Terrorist List,” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/ (accessed 21 
April 2020) and Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, “Hamas,” 
German Federal Domestic Intelligence Service, https://bit.ly/ 
2zQRLSp (accessed 21 April 2020). 
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My approach promotes a policy of critical dialogue 
with delegitimization supporters in a manner that 
provides European partners a proactive role. Contrary 
to the position often expressed by various opposers 
of delegitimization, my approach promotes a policy 
of critical dialogue with these types of delegitimiza-
tion supporters rather than a policy of containment 
or isolation. This dialogue aims first and foremost to 
be a policy tool to encourage an informed discussion 
about the inclusion of the delegitimization agenda 
in these organizations’ platforms and serves as an in-
centive for agenda revision. Specifically, in regards to 
Palestinian NGOs, assertive engagement aims to turn 
the European foreign policy community’s feedback 
into a clear message to Palestinian partners that de-
legitimization represents a central point of divergence 
between European positions and their own. At mini-
mum, it could prevent a false perception that the inter-
national community is supportive of Palestinian or 
international attempts to delegitimize Israel as a state. 
The proposed policy corresponds with two factors 
that influence civil society activity in the occupied 
territories. First, as mentioned, the majority of Pales-
tinian civil society organizations officially support 
key items of the delegitimization agenda. Therefore, 
disconnecting ties with them would result in cur-
tailing European support to important agents of 
capacity-building and development within Palestinian 
society.137 Second, the current trend of non-normali-
zation creates a reality of almost complete disconnec-
tion between Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. 
In such a reality, the role that Western civil society 
engagement plays with Palestinian civil society is ever 
more important. Western civil society actors often 
serve as a rare voice of moderation in times of grow-
ing friction, and as an important promoter of the 
two-state solution in a time when this model is being 
challenged by both Israeli policies and Palestinian 
radicalization. Rather than being seen as a responsive 
adjustment to a changing reality, assertive dialogue 
with implicit supporters should be perceived as a pro-
active step. 
Unpacking the proposed policy of assertive engage-
ment entails practical steps in the relations of Euro-
 
137 Many of these NGOs serve as key agents in the attempt 
to build state and self-governing capacities within the 
occupied territories. Others can be seen as conflict manage-
ment instruments for their support in improving the quality 
of life for Palestinians or offering non-violent methods to 
resist the occupation. 
pean governmental and NGOs with implicit Palestin-
ian supporters. A few proposals in this context: 
∎ Apply a critical dialogue with these organizations 
by emphasizing the contradiction in perceptions 
regarding the method of protest as well as the 
political approach to the resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
∎ Create linkage-based incentives: European partners 
could offer incentives for Palestinian partners to 
revise their discourse and affiliations by creating a 
direct linkage between abstaining from supporting 
delegitimization and upgrading the level of part-
nership. 
∎ In accordance with the current EU policy: Increase 
measures of oversight to prevent the utilization of 
funding for delegitimization-related activities. 
Proposed guideline for engagement with 
responsible critics: Empower 
Responsible critics serve as an important component 
in the differentiation between criticism and delegiti-
mization of Israel. Securing the space for responsible 
criticism of Israel’s policies is a key component in 
confronting the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Sup-
porting them serves two constructive goals. First, it 
enables an effective space for constructive criticism 
of current Israeli policies that stand in contradiction 
to European core positions. In the process, it assists in 
preserving the pluralistic nature of Israeli democracy 
by confronting attempts to limit spaces for criticism 
within Israel. Second, it prevents the “slippery slope” 
of criticism leading to delegitimization by preserving 
the possibility of being “pro-Palestinian” and, at the 
same time, supporting Israel’s right to exist. 
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Abbreviations 
BDS Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 
BNC BDS National Committee 
EU European Union 
IHRA International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NIF New Israel Fund 
PA Palestinian Authority 
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 
PRC Palestinian Return Centre 
PSC Palestine Solidarity Campaign 
UN United Nations 
WCAR World Conference against Racism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
